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Preface
Ten years ago, in 2011, the FuturICT project was selected as the No. 1 European
flagship pilot in the area of future and emerging technologies. Its goal was to under-
stand and manage complex, global and socially interactive systems, focusing on
sustainability and resilience.
By integrating Information and Communication Technology (ICT), complexity
science and social sciences, it intended to promote a paradigm shift towards a symbi-
otic co-evolution of ICT and society. Leveraging data from complex, global ICT
systemswould enable the development ofmodels of techno-socio-economic systems.
In turn, insights from thesemodelswould shape a newgeneration of socially adaptive,
self-organized ICT systems.
Following on from these flagship pilots, FLAG-ERA issued transnational calls to
build communities kick-starting disruptive, new, large-scale research in Europe. The
FuturICT 2.0 project was submitted and accepted for funding, starting in February
2017 for a four-year period.
At the heart of FuturICT 2.0, our team at the ETH Zürich node started to work
on the idea for a socio-ecological finance system, Finance 4.0 (FIN4), which could
advance sustainable societies through a bottom-up and self-organizing approach. Our
goals were highly ambitious—creating a FIN4 community, building a demonstrator
using emergent technologies and combining research with development. We, there-
fore, had to be resourceful, planning communication, events and coding cycles in a
way that allowed us to get the most out of these years. Furthermore, we wanted to
involve bachelor, master and doctoral students.
Together with our partners, we organized the BIOTS Blockchain and Internet of
Things (IoT) School, later becoming theBETHBlockchain School for Sustainability.
Students received education in distributed ledger technology systems, coding and
sustainability topics for two days and then worked on their own proofs of concept for
another two days, before presenting them to the other participants. This programme
was so successful that it was regularly oversubscribed, and it produced excellent use
cases. Many of these students subsequently found blockchain-related jobs or stayed
to write their bachelor or master thesis with us.
v
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From the very beginning, FuturICT 2.0 has strongly emphasized the importance
of outreach. As a project supported by FLAG-ERA to form new communities around
an upcoming technical research field, our goal was to reach both, interested scientists
as well as representatives of civil society, and leverage their interest for the themes
of responsible innovation and sustainable technology.
To have an impact, we realized that we needed to reach out also to a wider public,
as well as opinion leaders and governmental institutions, raising their awareness for
ideas, concepts and technologies that could enable a sustainable and resilient society.
It was a logical consequence that FuturICT 2.0 moved on and established a
Climate City Cup.1 This programme encouraged individuals around the world to
help tackle climate change at the city level, without waiting many years for regu-
lations. People could collect and report data in five disciplines and collaborate to
improve the sustainability of their living environment.
The first Climate City Cup was held from mid-July to mid-November 2019. The
hope is to eventually run it every second year.
Following the model of the Olympic Games, the Climate City Cup encourages
friendly competition, where citizens from different cities aim to develop open-source
solutions to improving the sustainability of their city. The program fosters collective
intelligence and provides a platform for knowledge sharing and exchange, while
building bridges between communities working towards sustainable development.
The aim of the Climate City Cup 2019 was to improve urban sustainable develop-
ment around the globe, with registered partner cities in Austria, Finland, Germany,
India, Mali, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Turkey and the USA.
The Climate City Cup encouraged registered cities to compete in various
disciplines and, thereby, advance
• air quality measurement and the reduction of pollution
• flight compensation (carbon offsetting)
• mobility and commuting practices
• circular economy
• energy consumption.
In November 2019, the first Climate City Cup awards ceremony was held in
Zurich. Participants from 44 cities had contributed and generated more than tens of
thousands of data points on sustainability. Moreover, an air quality sensor for crowd
sensing applications was developed (see Fig. 1). And, this is just the beginning…
This book offers insights into a new way of thinking and a novel way of tech-
nology use, as it has been outlined in a technical report entitled “FuturICT 2.0:
Towards a sustainable digital societywith a socio-ecological finance system (Finance
4.0)”.2 Compared to the previous eBook, this edition here has been enriched by addi-
tional chapters motivating and explaining a multi-dimensional, participatory kind of




Fig. 1 Air quality sensor produced within the FuturICT 2.0 City Cup setting
with Internet of Things-based measurements, it can be seen as a new kind of real-
time feedback and incentive system, which can help our economy and society to
better reach its large variety of goals.
Zürich, Switzerland Stefan Klauser
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From Fiat to Crypto: The Present
and Future of Money
Marcus M. Dapp
Abstract This chapter aims to offer readers an entry point to the deep discussion
of this volume and the rationale for the “Finance 4.0” system described in later
chapters. What is money, why is it designed this way, and what could it become in
the crypto age? The chapter contains three parts. The first part describes in rough
strokes the basic functions of money and how today’s fiat money system implements
them. The second part offers a modest critique of the fiat money system, arguing that
many problems take root in the intimate power relationship between “money and
state.” The final part presents two cases that address some of the shortcomings. The
first is Bitcoin that infamously pursues a state-independent, decentralized conception
of money. The second is Finance 4.0, a system that proposes a participatory multi-
dimensional money system with built-in incentives for sustainable behavior. If more
readers feel empowered to enter the public debate for a better money system in the
twenty-first century, this short introduction achieved its aim.
The Mystery of Money: What It Is and How It Works
The study of money, above all other fields in economics,
is one in which complexity is used to disguise truth or to evade truth, not to reveal it.
— John Kenneth Galbraith
The author thanks Axel Apfelbacher, Mark C. Ballandies, Jürg Conzett, Carina Ines Hausladen,
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The Nature of Money
The historian Yuval NoahHarari argues that humans acquired the ability to cooperate
at large scale (beyond Dunbar’s number of ~150 individuals) by inventing common
myths. Myths are stories that exist only in our collective imagination [1]. Along
with nation, church, country, city, company, etc., money became one of the most
influential collective imaginations in history. Its role is special because it allows
transferring value across space and time. So far, money is the “most universal and
most efficient system of mutual trust ever devised” [1]. All concepts making up the
monetary system are such imaginations: from the value of coins and paper bills to
the numbers on our bank accounts. A fascinating thought we could change the world
by changing our imaginations…
As we use money every day without much thought, it is important to understand
how it does work before discussing its future. Money is “the set of assets in an
economy that people regularly use to buy goods and services from other people”
[2]. In particular, money serves certain desired economic functions, which require
certain physical properties of assets. Over time, different approaches have evolved
into different legal types of money (Fig. 1).
To be usable as money, assets need to fulfill three economic functions [2, 3].
First, they need to be able to act as a medium of exchange. A medium of exchange
is something that sellers accept from buyers in exchange for a good or service in the
act of purchase. In order for the transaction to take place, it is crucial that the seller
accepts the medium of exchange the buyer is offering for payment. Otherwise, the
purchase will not take place.
Given mutual agreement, partners can split a transaction over time. Either the
buyer receives the good before paying or the seller receives payment before delivering
the good. For that to work, the medium of exchange needs to keep its value over that
period. So, second, an asset used as money needs to be able to act as a store of value.
The longer the time period can last, the better.
To express the value of goods in terms of other goods would be cumbersome. To
say, for example: “a lunch costs the same as ten bars of chocolate, and one bar of
Fig. 1 Economic functions, physical properties, and legal types of money
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chocolate costs the same as two packs of chewing gum.” Acceptance and use of the
‘money’ asset must be so widespread that people also express prices in it. In other
words, the asset’s third function is to act as a measure, as a unit of account.
People have used assets with different physical properties over time. The physical
properties determine howwell an asset fulfills the economic functions and whether it
ends up serving as money. Various assets served as medium of exchange in different
regions at different times: cattle, shells, nails, tobacco, cotton, copper, silver, gold,
and so on. Yet, not all were money. According to Hülsmann, people used the term
‘money’ only when a medium of exchange was “generally accepted in society” [4].
Making an asset good money requires four physical properties [5]. (1) Fungibility
means the asset is of homogeneous texture and can be portioned in equally looking
pieces. Thus, it does not matter which piece one uses (in contrast, e.g., shells and
cattle come in different shapes, forms, and sizes). (2) Portability means the asset can
be cheaply transported from one location to another because it is neither too big nor
too heavy to carry. (3) Durability means the asset does not wear off with repeated
use and changing hands over time. It also should not deteriorate on its own (e.g.,
tobacco will rot and silver may tarnish). (4) Divisibility means the asset is usable
in small fractions of the same kind to represent typical values in daily transactions
(e.g., silver-made coins or paper bills).
These properties subtly guided humans when deciding what goods to use as
medium of exchange, store of value, and unit of account. Over millennia, people
have used and accepted precious metals for payments. In particular, gold stood the
literal test of time, for good reasons.1 The advanced national economies of the last
200 years experienced an evolution of money along three different legal types (cf.
Figure 1). The oldest type is commodity money that carries intrinsic value it derives
from something deemed valuable in itself [2]. TheKrugerrand, themost popular gold
coin worldwide, is an example of commodity money. The gold it contains has value
by itself as it is in demand for jewelry and other industrial purposes. In contrast, a
modern banknote has no other use and thus no intrinsic value.
An important problem with commodity money is the danger of debasement. By
replacing some fraction of a coin’s precious metal content (e.g., gold or silver) with
a cheaper base metal (e.g., copper or nickel), the issuer can profit from the difference
between face value and metal value. Such diluted money loses value over time.
At this point, it is useful to introduce the term inflation. Commonly (and narrowly)
defined, it is an increase in the overall level of prices [2]. To tell causes and effects
apart, it is clearer to stick to the primary definition presented by Hazlitt [7]: Inflation
is the increase in supply of money and credit. Each individual note and coin becomes
less valuable because there are more of them available. Goods then rise in price
not because goods are scarcer than before, but because notes and coins are more
abundant.
Ammous [8] argues that historic periods with political regimes that avoided
inflating the value of money (that was backed by precious metals) coincide with
1The Periodic Table of the Elements offers, by stepwise exclusion, a line of reasoning for gold as
prime element for money [6].
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prosperity for nations and citizens by increased trade, investment, and innovation.
Likewise, failures to keep the monetary system ‘sound’ led to economic decline over
time. Table 1 contrasts the periods of prosperity and decline spanning two millennia,
as identified by Ammous [8].
The second type is representative money that has no intrinsic value, but is instead
backed by a commodity, usually a precious metal like gold or silver [9]. Its origins
date back to the city-states of Venice [10] and Florence [8] in thirteenth-century
Italy. Goldsmiths had started to store people’s gold and silver coins for safekeeping
as they owned firm buildings and safes to store the precious metals for their own
trade. People handed over their coins against a small fee and got a receipt on paper
to represent their coins. To get them back, they had to hand in the receipt. People
realized that paying with paper receipts was more comfortable than carrying heavy
coins around; they hardly came back to get their coins. This marks the beginnings
of modern-day paper money and the practice of banking [10].
By analogy with commodity money, representative money faces a danger of
debasement (inflation) as well. Printing more “representative” banknotes than there
exist precious metals on reserve to back them may lead to a shortage when many
clients want to redeem their precious metal at the same time, like during a “bank
run”.
Representative money flourished at the end of the nineteenth, beginning of the
twentieth century, when around 50 nations were on the gold standard [8]. Govern-
ments were in direct control of gold, while citizens only held paper notes redeemable
for gold. Ammous argues that the reasons “a small war in Central Europe” in 1914
was able to explode into “the first global war in human history” [8] were monetary
rather than geopolitical. Early in the conflict, governments suspended gold convert-
ibility and started to finance what became an “out-of-control arms race” [11]. Unlike
during previous wars, they could now access the wealth of the entire population
rather than just the government treasuries, which in the past set a natural limit to the
size of wars. Without this possibility, World War I would have been much smaller in
scope and duration, Ammous argues [8].
As all currencies had lost in value because of war financing, it was politically
difficult to re-enter the gold standard [11]. It would have required to admit that
governments significantly devalued the currency, e.g., down to 51% of prewar levels
for losing power Germany. Therefore, countries took the “easier path” of currency
debasement to solve their economic problems. Germany used inflation to pay for
the large reparations stemming from the Treaty of Versailles—which promptly led
to the infamous hyperinflation in Germany in 1922/1923, paving the way to the
Nazi regime and World War II [11]. The USA also engaged in inflationary monetary
policy in the 1920s, leading to the infamous October 1929 stock market crash and
the decade-long Great Depression, which only ceased when the USA entered World
War II in 1940.Within five years, state-imposedwar productionmade unemployment
“disappear” into the military and increased state expenses by a factor of ten [11].
The international system based on the gold standard was no longer functional,
and war and economic devastation were rampant. Ammous [8] argues that money



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6 M. M. Dapp
gradually turned into a politically controlled instrument rather than a market-priced
commodity.
It was John Maynard Keynes who, in 1939, delivered the theoretical argument to
legitimize further government intervention [12]. Keynes argued in favor of continued
spending in the economy (high aggregate demand, including government spending)
as it determines the overall level of economic activity. Inadequate aggregate demand,
in contrast, could lead to prolonged periods of high unemployment. He argued for
fiscal and monetary policies to mitigate the adverse effects during economic reces-
sions and depressions, and restraint during prosperous times [12]. Table 2 shows
the series of regulations and international agreements that unfolded to implement
Keynes’ ideas.
Table 2 Drift from representative money to fiat money (own research)
1913 US Federal Reserve Act. Establishment of the Federal Reserve system (FED) [11]
1922 Genoa Conference establishes US dollar and British pound as reserve currencies for other
countries, next to gold [13]
1929 US stock market crash leads to the decade-long Great Depression period [11]
1930 Bank of International Settlement (BIS) is established to facilitate reparations imposed on
Germany by the Treaty of Versailles after World War I. Today’s role is to foster monetary
and financial cooperation and serve as a “bank for central banks” (cf. footnote 5)
1933 Newly elected US President Roosevelt initiates “New Deal” program to counter the Great
Depression [14]
Roosevelt issues Executive Order No. 6102 to “prohibit the hoarding of gold coin, gold
bullion, and gold certificates within the continental United States”, demanding US
citizens to sell their gold at 20.67 USD per ounce to the US Treasury2
1934 US Gold Reserve Act. Among its wide-ranging provisions are: (1) confiscation of all gold
owned by the FED and transfer to the US Department of Treasury, (2) prohibition to
redeem dollar bills for gold, (3) establishment of the Exchange Stabilization Fund to
control the dollar price without the FED, (4) authorization of the president to set a new
price of gold by proclamation (sic!) [15]. The new price is 35 USD per ounce, i.e. 69%
higher
1944 Agreement on the Bretton Woods System [8, 16]:
(1) The US dollar becomes global reserve currency with fixed exchange rates for other
central banks. Currencies are convertible to USD, and (only) the USD is convertible
to gold. For that, US buys gold from other countries at 35 USD per ounce. The
“fixed” exchange rates can be altered to address “fundamental disequilibrium”
(2) The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is established to coordinate the global group
of central banks on exchange rate stability
(3) The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (today World Bank
Group) is established to provide financial assistance for post World War II
reconstruction and economic development
1971 US President Nixon announces unilateral measures to address domestic inflation and
unemployment as well as the threat of an international gold run on the US3
(1) He suspends international gold convertibility for central banks, thus halting the
Bretton Woods Agreement.
(2) He freezes prices and wages for 90 days and raises tariff on all dutiable imports by an
extra ten percent.
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With the Bretton Woods agreement, the world had a system of fixed currency
exchange rates, with the US dollar at the center as the global reserve currency,
and the only one backed by gold reserves, deposited by all nations in Fort Knox.
In 1971, however, US President Nixon faced a difficult situation: a high domestic
unemployment and inflation rate combined with the fact that more foreign-held
dollars circulated outside its borders than the US had gold reserves required action.
In a swift unilateral move, Nixon announced national wage and price controls and the
end of the convertibility of US dollars to gold for other countries. The announcement
effectively made the Bretton Woods Agreement obsolete [11]. The “Nixon shock”
decoupled the US dollar (and with it all other currencies) from the gold standard and
marked the departure from representative money.
With the third type ofmoney, fiat money,we take a final step away from grounding
money in physical valuable assets as fiat money is not redeemable in gold anymore.
Due to its omnipresence today, it deserves its own section.
The Fiat Money System
Fiat money is the monetary system that has gradually developed over the last few
centuries and has become the globally dominant system over the last few decades.
A widely used student textbook of economics defines it as “money without intrinsic
value that is used as money because of government decree” [2]. In other words,
printed notes and minted coins (and bank deposits) only have value because the
government declared them“legal tender” to discharge debt. Thegovernment demands
tax payments in legal tender, thus creating a continuous demand for its money.
The ultimate backing of themoneymonopoly is military state power. “Nowadays,
the political power uses its power of coercion to impose a monopoly on the production
and circulation of money, which in particular implies the existence of a ‘legal tender’,
that is, a prohibition on currencies other than the ‘national’ currency” [17]. A
national currency directs and enforces monetary policy in the domestic economy
and constitutes an instrument of geopolitical power among nations. Controlling the
dominant currency yields considerable benefits to the respective state like “the ability
to issue securities that are always in high demand by the rest of the world” [18]. In
2020, theworld is still accepting theUSdollar as its reserve currency, despite tensions
in trade relations and rivalry between the USA and the Republic of China.
Controlling money means primarily controlling the money supply. Figure 2 illus-
trates the entities and mechanisms involved in the domestic process of fiat money
creation in a simplified form.
The macro-mechanism of fiat money creation is an interplay between fiscal and
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Fig. 2 Creating fiat money is an intricate interplay between fiscal and monetary policy
treasury, the central bank, and commercial banks. The mechanism comprises five
steps (Fig. 2). (1) It starts with deficit spending, which means the government needs
to spend more money than it currently has, maybe because of political promises
made before an election. Government has two options to address deficit spending.
One of the two options (leaving the third, defaulting on the debt, aside) is fiscal policy.
Yet, raising taxes is usually an unpopular move for an elected government. (2) Thus
remains the option to borrow money by issuing government bonds. As bonds are
loanswith a fixed interest rate, the government effectively commits current and future
taxpayers to new, additional national debt. (3) To generate income, the government
treasury holds bond auctions, in which only a selected group of commercial banks
(“primary dealers”) is allowed to tender, i.e., to make bids. The banks bid to buy parts
of the national debt to earn interestwith it. (4) In so-calledopen market operations, the
central bank can purchase specific types of securities in the openmarket, directly from
other market players. As counterparts in these open market operations, commercial
banks sell these bonds to the central bank, at a profit. (5) To pay, the central bank
simply “use[s] the computer to mark up” the credit account of the respective primary
dealer on its balance sheet, thus calling new money into existence in a way “much
more akin to printing money than it is to borrowing” [19].
Technically, the central bank is buying government bonds through “open market
operations” (US Federal Reserve) or “asset purchase programs” (European Central
Bank). In the case of the European Central Bank, one of currently five different
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asset purchase programs, the “Public Sector Purchase Program (PSPP)”, deals with
government-issued bonds.4
The micro-mechanism for creating money involves commercial banks and their
clients. To describe it, we need to continue the story of the Venetian goldsmiths
from the previous section. Realizing that most people left their precious metal coins
with them for the convenience of paper receipts, some “astute goldsmiths” started to
issue more receipts than they had coins in store. “[T]hey began to issue more money
than they actually held in coins” [10] and increased their income without increasing
reserves. This deliberate act became common practice today, known as fractional
reserve banking: Banks do not need to keep 100% of clients’ deposits as reserve,
but only a fraction. Since January 2012, the reserve ratio in the euro area is only 1%
[20].
By converting dormant deposit money into loans, banks create new money. Frac-
tional reserve banking permits banks to use idle deposits to generate additional
interest returns on the loans issued. “[W]henever a bank makes a loan, it simultane-
ously creates a matching deposit in the borrower’s bank account, thereby creating
newmoney” [21]. For example, with 1 million of client money and a reserve require-
ment of 10%, a bank can hand out ten loans each of size 1 million, thus creating
9 million in additional deposit money.
This logic rests on the assumption that clientswill neverwithdraw all their deposits
at the same time. Of course, this assumptionmay break during crises and lead to bank
runs—a situation when a bank, in order to be able to pay out many deposits, asks
many clients to repay their loans quickly. If the clients are unable to do so, the bank
gets into trouble.5 Thus, the circle closes because one of the main tasks of modern
central banks is to prevent such crises and ensure monetary stability among other
objectives, as summarized by Ugolini [23]:
Nowadays, central bankers agree in acknowledging that they are entrusted twomain (possibly
conflicting) tasks: securing financial stability andmonetary stability. The former task consists
of the provision of the microeconomic central banking functions: the management of the
payment system, lending of last resort, and banking supervision. The latter task consists of
the provision of the macroeconomic central banking functions: the issuance of money and
the conduct of monetary policy.
Reflecting on thesemechanisms of creating fiatmoney leads to a number of critical
remarks.
4Cf. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/omt/html/index.en.html.
5The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) as part of the Bank for International
Settlement (BIS) is composed of central banks from 28 jurisdictions. It issues the “Basel Accords”, a
set of recommendations on banking supervision and risk management, regulating minimum capital
requirements including risk weights for asset classes. “Basel III”, intended as a response to the
Global Financial Crisis 2008/2009, was agreed in 2010 to put stricter risk management metrics for
banks by 2015. It was extended repeatedly and will, most recently because of COVID-19, not be
implemented earlier than 2023, over a decade later [22].
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AModest Critique of Money
Analyzing the mechanisms of the fiat monetary system reveals several issues that
warrant a closer look. The following critique cannot be exhaustive, but aims to raise
some issues that are particularly relevant with regard to the proposals laid out in the
last section and the main chapter on “Finance 4.0” of this volume.
Fiat Money Is Debt-Based
Fiat money is created as debt in the moment of issuing loans [24]. A new asset
purchase by a central bank or a new loan by a commercial bank increases the money
supply in a subtle way that is invisible for most people. “Debt-based” means that
an amount someone owns represents an equal amount of debt for someone else in
the system. Hence, creating new money means creating new debt. Nations with fiat
money systems tend to accumulate debt over time.6 Creating money from “thin air”
also permits banks (and governments) to gain excessive financial and political power
in relation to all other members of society. Moreover, the fiat money systemmisleads
the world to live beyond its means and thus expedites the sustainability crisis.
How to reduce debt? According to Dalio [25], governments have four options
to reduce debt and debt service: (1) austerity policy (i.e., spending less); (2) debt
defaults/restructuring; (3) the central bank creating money, making purchases or
providing guarantees; (4) redistributing money and credit from “those who have
more than they need to those who have less.”
The first two options are unpopular among governments as they are hard to explain
to voters. A policy of austerity can be devastating as falling prices may lead to
a downward feedback cycle of falling asset prices and increasing unemployment
(“deflationary shock”), which may end in debt defaults of many businesses. The
fourth option, to transfer money/credit between stakeholder groups, is also delicate
as powerful voter groups may lose out and thus fight the policy. For officials aiming
for re-election, this is a problematic situation. Besides, there are often legal issues
when governments interfere with private property.
This leaves governments with the third option: “creating money” to finance the
debts as discussed in the previous section. Under normal circumstances, the typical
inflation target hovers around 2% (a coincidental and arbitrary number [26]), which
is a money creation rate that only experts recognize. Most voters do not realize the
continuous price increases although at this 2% rate prices double every 35 years.
The consequence is an ever increasing amount of government debt, for which all
citizens need to pay. Where do the countries stand today? The Managing Director
6In 2012, the EU created the ‘European Stability Mechanism’, an intergovernmental organization
in Luxembourg, with the mission to provide financial assistance in the form of ‘ESM loans’ to
member countries experiencing financing problems, like Cyprus and Greece in the past. cf. https://
www.esm.europa.eu/assistance/lending-toolkit.
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Fig. 3 Arsenal of central banking instruments of Federal Reserve System and Eurosystem
of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) stated that global public debt will reach a
“record-high of about 100 percent of GDP in 2020” [27].
Distortion of Price Signals
As illustrated for the Federal Reserve System7 and the Eurosystem8 in Fig. 3,
analyzing the opaque arsenal of central bank instruments is a staggering experience.
Most people would have a hard time realizing and understanding the implications of
running these complicated structures.
7For the Federal Reserve System instruments, cf. https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/
policytools.htm.
8For the Eurosystem instruments, cf. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/omt/html/index.
en.html.
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End of October 2020, the stock of all asset purchase programs managed by the
Eurosystem stood at 3,470 trillion EUR, while the balance sheet of the Federal
Reserve stood at 7,157 trillionUSD. In otherwords, each of themany instruments has
the potential to inject hundreds of billions into the monetary system.9 It is important
to understand that all this newmoney is created as credit (debt) without an equivalent
increase in the production of goods and services in the real economy. Channeling so
much new money into the system leads to an upward pressure on price levels in the
market, because the additional money available is not matched by more goods and
services. Hence, assets, goods, and services are becoming more expensive in terms
of monetary units (USD, EUR, etc.) to be spent for consuming them or investing into
them, solely because the monetary base is inflated without any change in the real
economic conditions. From January 2009 to September 2020, the Consumer Price
Index10 for urban consumers in the US (CPI) rose by 23% and the Harmonized Index
of Consumer Prices in the EU (HICP) by 19%.11
Economies are complex socioeconomic networks with nonlinear relationships,
i.e., causes and effects are not proportional to each other [28]. The effect the central
bank has on employment decisions by businesses via influencing the conditions for
commercial bank loans is one example for such a nonlinear relationship.However, the
assumed logic—cheaper loans lead to investments and higher levels of employ-
ment—may not work as intended. Rather, one may find “jumpy”, nonlinear behavior
for a variety of reasons: (i) banks may not pass the money on as loans, but channel
it to other markets such as stocks; (ii) businesses may not take out loans to avoid
additional debt in difficult times; or (iii) businesses may take out loans but not use
them to keep staff or expand, but to buy back shares. When making such decisions,
banks and businesses may take “private” information (unknown and unknowable
to the central bank) into consideration and decide in unintended ways. Anything
between none and all three options may happen at the same time, leading to seem-
ingly contradictory effects. For example, some businesses may go insolvent12 for
lack of orders, while excess money flows into asset markets. Thus, inflated prices
may become “visible” outside consumer price indices: in rising stock prices, rising
gold and silver prices, or rising real estate prices.
9For the ECB figure cf. previous footnote plus figure from https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/imp
lement/pepp/html/index.en.html. For the FED figure cf. https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetaryp
olicy/bst_recenttrends.htm.
10Consumer price indexing, the officialmetric for inflation, is challenged because the composition of
the reference basket of goods, dynamic adjustments, etc. significantly influence the price tracking.
In contrast, crowd-sourced indices like the Chapwood Index for the US show consistent higher
inflation rates: https://chapwoodindex.com/. For an introduction to the debate, see: https://www.inv
estopedia.com/articles/07/consumerpriceindex.asp.
11For the US cf. https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/CPIAUCSL, for the EU cf. https://sdw.ecb.eur
opa.eu/.
12Or, they may not go insolvent but turn into so-called “zombie companies”, unable to pay the
interest on their loans, but kept alive by very low interest rates and/or government support. About
16-36% of companies in the EU in 2019 [29] and about 20% in the US in 2020 [30] are considered
to be zombie companies. Directing funds away from healthy companies is a major concern as it
may depress employment and growth in the future.
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It is very hard to predict and control how central bank money ends up being
used. In other words, central banks pursue this approach without knowing when they
reach a tipping point that causes the system to shift to a new regime [28]. Such a new
regime could be hyperinflation, an asset bubble burst, or a wave of insolvencies and
unemployment. All of them may lead to large fractions of the general public and
financial markets to lose trust in the stability of the national currency, resulting in
bank runs and large declines in currency value (relative to other currencies or assets).
Consequently, the acceptance ofmoney in exchange for goods or services deteriorates
and the common myth of money starts to collapse [1]. Evaluating empirical data
on such tipping points is sobering. Since 1800, bank runs (affecting one bank),
bank panics (affecting several banks), or banking crises (affecting entire countries)
are happening every 7–10 years on average, with no significant difference between
advanced economies and emerging markets [31].
Finally, as this additional money needs to enter the economy at some point and
then start moving from one market participant to the next, the so-called “Cantillon
effect” plays out [32]. The first users of new money can still use it to buy goods
at unchanged prices. However, with each market transaction, the information about
the new money spreads in the markets and prices gradually adjust. In other words,
there is a re-allocation of resources “in favor of those economic agents that receive
the new money first” [32]. The question then is: who in society benefits from new
money first?
Overall, increasing the money supply in the absence of an increase in economic
activity causes distortions in the price levels and puts a large group of market
participants in difficult positions.
The Economy Is Complex, Not Just Complicated
From a systems science perspective, the main question is: How do we think a small
group of people with a narrow set of goals and a one-dimensional metric can steer
a complex economic network consisting of millions of individuals, to a state of
comprehensive well-being for the majority?
Ad “small group”: The Governing Council of the Eurosystem consists of 22, the
Federal OpenMarket Committee of the FEDof 12 individuals [33]. These two groups
are steering the economic lives of 330.5 million inhabitants in 52 US states and
447.7million inhabitants in 27 EU countries.13 Nomatter howmuch staff assigned or
which key metrics used, it seems to be impossible for 34 humans to get a sufficiently
deep understanding of these enormous (and enormously diverse) economies in order
to decide top-down what the single best monetary policy is for everyone.
Ad “narrow goals”: Contemporary economics puts an undue focus on one goal –
monetary efficiency – at the neglect of health, sustainability, happiness, well-being,
13Cf. https://www.census.gov/ and https://www.statista.com/statistics/253372/total-population-of-
the-european-union-eu/.
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and other societal goals many deem important [24]. The FED’s monetary policy is
“to promote maximum employment, stable prices, and moderate long-term interest
rates in the US. economy” [34]. The primary objective of the ECB’s monetary policy
is to maintain price stability. The ECB aims at inflation rates of “below, but close to,
2% over the medium term” [35]. In other words, the primary goal of central banks is
to mitigate price rise, i.e., inflation, which is the key design feature of a fiat money
system in the first place. This narrow goal, only to make the fiat money system
work, stands against the “Agenda 2030”, a holistic set of 17 goals aiming at global
sustainable development, unanimously adopted by 193 member states of the United
Nations in 2015 [36]. Yet, the monetary system, which dominates world affairs, lacks
transparency, democratic governance and legitimacy. How is this possible?
Ad “one control metric”: Using a one-dimensional metric for decision-making
and resource allocation is dangerous and can considerably affect the functioning of
the overall system of society. Other complex systems use diverse variables, i.e., a
multi-dimensional approach, to steer the entire system [37, 38]. The human body,
for example, uses several mechanisms (nervous system, hormone system, immune
system, etc.) to keep the overall organism well-performing, where even the brain
does not control all processes (cf. the chapter on “Qualified Money” in this volume).
In the same vein, steering modern complex economies may require more complex,
multi-dimensional feedback mechanisms for a self-organization of society towards
overall prosperity and well-being [39].
Accordingly, Dosi and Roventini [40] make the case for “agent-based models
as the standard way of theorizing in macroeconomics”. They see the economy as
a complex evolving system, an ecology populated by heterogeneous agents, whose
far-from-equilibrium interactions continuously change the structure of the system.
In closing, I would briefly like to mention that the failure of the majority of
economists to adequately predict the financial crisis 2008/2009 has caused a large-
scale critical discourse within the economics discipline [41, 42]. Felber presents
a collection of wide-ranging criticisms that go as far as accusing the economic
profession of mathematical fetish and “physics envy”, of theory monoculture and
narrowness in teaching [43]. As a consequence, an international student initiative
for “Pluralism in Economics”14 has formed in 2014, consisting of 82 associations
of economics students from 31 countries. It calls for an “overhaul of the way their
subject is taught” [44]. The dominance of narrow free-market theories at top universi-
ties, it claims, harms the world’s ability to confront challenges like financial stability
and climate change.
Separation of State and Money in the Digital Age
Central banks have limited control over how newly issued money is used (cf.
the discussion on ‘price signals’ above). This is the main argument they put forward
14Cf. http://www.isipe.net/.
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in favor of “central bank issued digital currencies (CBDC)”. Several institutions
published reports on CBDC in 2020 [45–49]. Note, however, that digital currencies
in this context and cryptocurrencies as discussed further below are entirely different
concepts.
According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), CBDC would give central
banks a “fast and direct means to provide fiscal assistance to vulnerable populations
during the emergency, including to the unbanked” [49]. CBDC allows injecting new
money directly into (newly created) central bank accounts for businesses and citizens.
Themoney could bypass the banking system,which is believed to reduce the liquidity
squeeze short-term and the dangers of inflation long-term.
Central banks see several advantages of digital currencies: (1) faster and cheaper
payment processing as large parts of the banking industry could be circumvented;
(2) more effective policy measures because of better targeting of groups and individ-
uals; (3) easier introduction of unpopular measures such as negative interest rates,
from which citizens could not escape as cash withdrawals would cease to exist, thus
rendering bank runs impossible.
It is important, however, to understand the severe implications of CBDC for citi-
zens. (1) It will be possible to track all transactions of all citizens and businesses in
real time.Making anonymous cash payments will be impossible, even for completely
legal transactions, thereby threaten privacy rights. (2) Governments can use trans-
action data to personalize fiscal policies (e.g., automatic taxation) and fiscal bene-
fits (e.g., automatic basic income). Subjugating these activities under democratic
accountability processes will be hard. The door for behavioral economists to nudge,
manipulate, or even prevent transactions for certain people will be wide open.
A new Surveillance Monetarism may arise, akin to Surveillance Capitalism [50],
only with different actors. Governments or central banks may analyze citizens and
influence their behavior with programmable CBDC and Artificial Intelligence. They
will become even more capable to track citizens and to conceal operations within
the already opaque fiat money system.
This new capability may have geopolitical implications when the CBDC is issued
by a large economic power (e.g., China, USA, EU). They may pressure trading
partners to accept their CBDC as they do with fiat currency today.15 In addition,
the foreign CBDC will put the partner countries’ citizens at risk of being monitored
by a foreign power. Thus, large and powerful ‘suppliers’ of a CBDC may be at an
advantage in bargaining monetary hegemony.
In his treatise against cash, Rogoff [51] presents a devious plan for ways that
governments can use to lure the population into letting go of cash. His recommen-
dations for phasing out paper currency are [51]: (1) make it more difficult to engage
in anonymous untraceable transactions repeatedly and on a large scale; (2) stretch
the transition phase over 10–15 years to avoid excessive disruptions and give insti-
tutions and people time to adapt; (3) give incentives to opt-in like free smartphones
and free accounts.
15The effect, called “Dollarization” or “Euroization”, is an example of currency substitution that
can happen with CBDC for similar reasons, but much more efficient.
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However, Rogoff’s conception of essential aspects of cryptocurrencies in general
and Bitcoin in particular has flaws [51], which is a reason for hope that there will
be a more positive ‘future of money.’ When it becomes clearer to more people, how
the current monetary system perpetuates disadvantages for a majority of citizens and
businesses, while new systems would offer advantages for many or all, history may
take another turn this time. In fact, the promise of ‘crypto money’ is to democratize
the creation and management of money in society.
The Many Futures of Money
I don’t believe we shall ever have a good money again before we take the thing out of the
hands of government, that is, we can’t take it violently out of the hands of government, all
we can do is by some sly roundabout way introduce something that they can’t stop.
—F.A. Hayek (1984)
The goal of my final section is to introduce new ways of thinking and designing
monetary systems in order to stretch the imagination for what might be possible. I
personally expect a greater diversity of digital incentive systems (‘crypto monies’)
in the future.
To illustrate the spectrum, let me introduce and discuss only two examples here.
Both share a few commonalities: (i) They differ significantly from the dominant
fiat money system, albeit in different ways; (ii) both would not be possible without
distributed ledgers, blockchain technology, and smart contracts; (iii) both share the
unconventional idea that money can and should be democratic.
The two examples also differ in significant ways from each other: (i) One aims
for ‘world dominance’ while the other is explicitly complementary in nature; (ii) one
implies a winner-takes-all dynamic, while the other foresees a plurality of monies
for different purposes; (iii) one is criticized for its energy consumption, while the
other has sustainability at its core; (iv) one is in productive use already for a decade,
while the other is still at the level of a research and demonstration project.
Bitcoin, a Radical Idea Refusing to Die
The root problem with conventional currency is all the trust that’s required to make it work.
The central banks must be trusted not to debase the currency, but the history of fiat currencies
is full of breaches of that trust.
—Satoshi Nakamoto (anonymous inventor of Bitcoin)
The main question regarding Bitcoin, the oldest cryptocurrency project (and
largest in monetary terms), is not, where the Bitcoin price will go. It is rather, why
is Bitcoin still alive in 2020 and why do people think it is even valuable?
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Twelve years ago, the Bitcoin project started with a white paper and a tiny piece
of software code serving as a proof of concept [52]. It took a while until the cryptog-
raphy community fully appreciated its design and started to contribute open-source
code and to develop the underlying technical system. Against all odds, what started
as a software network experiment of a few cryptography nerds, ended up becoming
a global phenomenon valued at 320 billion USD as of this writing (November 2020).
A few numbers for comparison: (1) This is more than the Gross Domestic Product of
80% of the 195 countries monitored by the IMF [53]; (2) to replace the “inefficient
global foreign exchange market” [8], Bitcoin would need to be valued in the vicinity
of 5 trillion USD or a factor of 15 higher; (3) to reach gold’s market value, Bitcoin’s
valuation would need to reach 8.4 trillion USD or 26 times its current value [54].
These factors seem enormous and unattainable. Yet, over the last decade, the valua-
tion grew from 0.01 USD to 10’000 USD per bitcoin. That is a factor of 1’000’000.16
Why do people think Bitcoin deserves this valuation?
Note how themonetary properties of the Bitcoin system contradict those of the fiat
money system. First, consider its “absolute scarcity” in supply [8]. Roughly every ten
minutes, a new block of transactions is created and the miner receives a reward called
“block subsidy”. Starting with 50 bitcoin initially, this block subsidy is halved every
210’000 blocks. As the number of halvings is limited to 64 (of which only 3 have
passed so far), the overall sum will approach but never exceed 21’000’000 bitcoin.
This hard cap is the exact opposite of the ever-increasing money supply in the fiat
money system.
Second, consider its “unforgeable costliness” of creation [55]. Similar to gold
mining, the process of creating new bitcoin needs a proof requiring a significant and
usually increasing amount of computing work to be done. And there are no shortcuts:
The “proof of work” algorithm is a contest to guess a large number with certain
characteristics (called a “hash”) for which no faster mathematical method than trial-
and-error is known. At the time of writing, the Bitcoin network needs to calculate
and test approx. 1018 hashes per second to construct a new valid block within ten
minutes. Dissimilar to gold, the difficulty level increases with increasing computing
capacity, while the rewards decrease over time (due to the halving mentioned above).
Using a stock-to-flow model, the prediction is that from 2024 onward, Bitcoin will
be harder to “mine” and thus grow less in supply than gold that has been used as a
store of value for millennia [56].
So, what are Bitcoin’s key properties that allowed it to become such a radically
different monetary system? People typically ascribe a set of properties to Bitcoin
similar to the ones listed in Table 3.
To fully understand Bitcoin, it is crucial to acknowledge the fact that only some
properties are design properties, consciously determined by the Bitcoin developers
at the outset of the project. Some others (marked with * in Table 3) are emergent
properties of the complex system that Bitcoin represents. The latter have not been
16It is an interesting design fact that Bitcoin has not two digits like most fiat currencies, but eight.
That means that 100,000,000 Satoshis (the smallest unit) make 1 BTC. In other words, Bitcoin is
many orders of magnitude more divisible than any money humans ever used.
18 M. M. Dapp
Table 3 List of properties typically ascribed to the Bitcoin system
Open: The Bitcoin software is free and open
source
Borderless: Being a global network,
national borders can not restrict transactions
Decentralized*: Bitcoin’s governance is not
hierarchical
Distributed: The underlying network is
peer-to-peer rather than a client/server
architecture
Permissionless: There are no barriers to using
Bitcoin
Censorship resistant: Neither transactions
nor users can be blocked
Immutable*: The Bitcoin ledger storing all
transactions cannot be modified unilaterally in
retrospect
Trustless*: Performing transactions on the
network requires no trusted third parties
consciously planned for (nor could they). However, they have been spontaneously
emerging over time because of themonetary properties described above. This allowed
a specific incentive system between users and miners in the network to self-organize.
Immutable: Bitcoin’s monetary policy dictates how new bitcoin come into exis-
tence. Some critics argue that software developers could simply change the software
code, and then, Bitcoin would behave differently, have no hard cap, different block
subsidies, etc. Yet, getting a different software code accepted into the official code
repository is not straightforward at all. Bitcoin’s code is open-source software. That
means if developers disagree with the direction the project is taking, they can always
take a copy of the code base and create an alternative path. Such departures, called
forks, usually mean a split (and, thus, a weakening) of the currency—and of the
community. Despite several forks (Bitcoin Cash, Bitcoin Satoshi’s Vision, Bitcoin
Gold, and others), Bitcoin is still, by far, the most valued cryptocurrency network.
What would it take to rally the majority of the network nodes behind a software
change to switch to a different monetary policy? In the case of increasing the number
of bitcoin or introducing inflation, it would require to convince a majority of Bitcoin
nodes to alter the network against their financial interests. This is unlikely, because
neither users nor miners have an incentive to change the Bitcoin code to create more
bitcoin retrospectively and thus inflate the existing supply (collectively owned by
them).
Trustless: Through the combinationofmining rewards and transaction fees,miners
have a monetary incentive to process transaction blocks, thus keeping the network
secure, alive and functioning as users expect it: this allows them to transact digi-
tally world-wide without the need for any intermediaries. Cheating (e.g., by double
spending bitcoin) became more difficult over time as it requires to control more than
half of the immense computing power needed to mine transaction blocks.
Decentralized: Over time and all over the world, the Bitcoin system attracted
an increasing number of participants, users, and miners to the network. The
Bitcoin network currently consists of roughly 10’000 listening nodes worldwide.
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25% of them do not reveal their country location.17 Mining needs initial investments,
but anyone can start to run their own full node and support the Bitcoin network.
Altogether, Bitcoin’s emergent properties make it a radically different monetary
system from what humans have known so far. They are also the cause for why it is
becoming harder to change Bitcoin’s inner workings, the longer it lives.
Now, assuming its design will remain stable, what could Bitcoin become like in
the future? If the trajectory of absolute scarcity of supply, unforgeable costliness of
creation, and immutable monetary policy will remain stable, Bitcoin may challenge
the global economic order in a couple of years [57]. If it continues to survive, Bitcoin
may become the first instance of “soundmoney” as theorized byAustrian Economics
[8, 58] or “ideal money” as proposed by Nash [59].
At some point, some governmentsmay consider usingBitcoin due to high national
debt or geopolitical challenges, e.g., surveillance monetarism imposed by a foreign
CBDC. They may find a hard, stable asset, which is less prone to international
geopolitics, to be more attractive than to continue defending their national currency.
Bitcoin could also become attractive for central banks to hold as a complementary
reserve asset to gold.
In 2020, the corporate sector has been starting to move into Bitcoin. The first few
publicly traded companies announced to store large sums of treasury funds in bitcoin
in order to reduce risk exposure to fiat currencies.18
So, what is it that Bitcoin is accomplishing? In the words of Bratton: “If nothing
else, Bitcoin has made money into a general design problem, as it should be, and
not just the design of financial products or the look of paper bills, but of vessel
abstractions of time, debt, work, and prestige” [60].
To illustrate the wide spectrum of cryptocurrency designs, let me now introduce
another design proposal, which is the result of rethinking how new kinds of money
could be used to promote inclusive socio-ecological development – the main topic
of this volume.
Finance 4.0, a Socio-Ecological Financial System
We started from the working hypothesis that at the core of most societal problems are
non-sustainable practices and misaligned incentive schemes. Currently, a boundless,
globalized economy is systematically creating negative externalities. This is not being
sanctioned sufficiently, because globalized regulation is not effective enough. The
monetary system adds to that by not setting the required incentives from within as it
feeds on two human traits: the cognitive bias to prefer a reward that arrives sooner
over one that arrives later (“hyperbolic discounting” or “low time preference”) and
17Cf. statistics and map of listening nodes on: https://bitnodes.io/. The number of full nodes is not
directly measurable, but estimated to be up to ten times larger.
18Cf. https://bitcointreasuries.org/ for a curated list.
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the inability of properly comprehending the long-term outcomes of an action while
deciding (“temporal myopia”) [61].
Today’s monetary system leads to a preference of short-term thinking and acting,
thereby overlooking or ignoring the long-term consequences. Therefore, we need
to re-arrange our societal incentive systems toward long-termism: “[f]rom a global
perspective, what matters most (in expectation) is that we do what is best (in expecta-
tion) for the general trajectory along which our descendants develop over the coming
millions, billions, and trillions of years” [62].
What is needed is monetary innovation, experimentation, and competition to
create a new relationship between money and sustainable practice. The good news
is: We already have parallel, state-independent complementary currency systems:19
Since the 1980s, approx. 3’500 to 4’500 such systems have been recorded in more
than 50 countries [10, 63].
If complementary currencies, i.e., alternatives to the current system, provide
evidence of successfully addressing some societal challenges, why are they not more
researched, discussed, andwritten about inmainstreameconomics?Hülsmann argues
that economists, too, act within an incentive system. While “championing govern-
ment involvement in money and banking pays the bills, promoting the opposite
agenda shuts the doors to an academic career. No consistent economist could expect
monetary economists to lead campaigns against central banks and paper money”
[4, 24].
Nevertheless, I would like to argue that money should aim at mitigating the
problem of negative externalities and at providing incentives toward sustainable
practice.
The current monetary system only optimizes for one goal—profit maximization.
Instead of optimizing only for “more money”, while neglecting other vital goals,
the monetary system should enable many feedback loops, to reflect the multitude
of goals humans have. Letting people create their own “monies” around these goals
will foster self-organization of markets for different externalities and enable the co-
evolution of different, distinct incentive systems (cf. the chapters onQualifiedMoney
and Finance 4.0 in this volume).
Using tokens to represent incentives is a concept from psychology that suggests
that incentive systems with tokens work best when the tokens are abstract, provide
immediate feedback, and lead to a bigger, longer-term reinforcer [64]. However, to
avoid nudging [65] and the dangers of top-down manipulation [66], it is important
that users are self-sovereign in creating and deciding on the actions they want to
incentivize and the tokens they want to use.
Many environmental and social problems are an example of a “commons dilemma,
a social situation in which a collective cost or risk is generated via the combined
negative externalities of numerous individuals who act rather independently from
19They are defined as a “unit (or system) of account that complements the official currency and has
been developed by a group of agents (individuals, economic and social structures, local authorities
or banks) that has formed a local network with a view to accounting for and regulating exchanges
of goods and services” [63].
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one another” [67]. Elinor Ostrom laid seminal groundwork by presenting principles
to overcome the commons dilemma by a common-pool resource management that is
effective for small, interconnected communities [68]. Scaling these to large, anony-
mous networks, however, is a challenge, that required polycentric approaches in the
past.
The emergence of distributed ledger technology and the token engi-
neering/cryptoeconomics discipline now allows us to implement and collectively
coordinate such sociotechnical complex systems at scale. The decentralization and
immutability of “blockchains” and “smart contracts” enable us to co-design and
co-monitor the rules needed to make the network produce positive action [69].
Put differently, cryptoeconomics has the potential to create a scalable peer-to-
peer governance model for managing the commons. Smart incentive design could be
away to encouragemore long-term thinking and succeed by establishingmechanisms
that reward long-term, sustainable behaviors on the scale of the Internet.
Rethinking the notions of value andmoney and shifting toward long-term thinking
are necessary to create the social ecosystems – Harari’s “collective imaginations” [1]
– that can collaboratively change our world from an extractive to a regenerative one.
Table 4 contrasts the two paradigms in terms of system goals, structure, and rules.
The core idea of the Finance 4.0 system, which will be detailed in the corre-
sponding chapter in this volume, is to propose design principles and a technolog-
ical infrastructure for a socio-ecological finance system that aims to maintain the
commons and reduces negative externalities. Hence, the core design principles of
the Finance 4.0 system are:
• The system encourages a multi-dimensional incentive design to address different
externalities and strengthen the commons by focusing on socio-ecological goals.
• The system allows for and encourages the bottom-up creation of tokens to
distribute the power to design and create money.
Table 4 Contrasting the paradigm of the current financial system with the Finance 4.0 system
Current financial system Finance 4.0 system
System goals are one-dimensional (profit
maximization) and self-referential (targets, e.g.,
money supply, interest rate, employment),
thereby ignoring important societal goals such
as protection of nature, health, or social
cohesion
System goals are pluralistic and
socio-ecological in nature, using tokens as a
multi-dimensional information signal and
money substitute to promote positive action to
benefit society at large [39, 70, 71]
System structure, consisting of governments,
central banks, international financial
organizations is hierarchical and only partly
democratically legitimized
System structure is peer-to-peer, consisting of
markets for positive action and dynamic
governing bodies that are participatory and
decentralized
System rules are defined top-down by the
institutional structure through fiscal and
monetary policy on national and international
level
System rules for positive actions, token
markets and governing bodies are
self-organized and democratically governed
with all users being able to participate
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• The system encourages the bottom-up creation of token designs and their use via
a permissionless, distributed peer-to-peer network.
• The governance of the system is democratic and decentralized to ensure division
of power and continuous design for value.
Finance 4.0 is a new kind of monetary system, which makes systemic interven-
tions more effective [72]. By considering different goals, Finance 4.0 can adapt its
function over time and as required. By enabling self-organization at all levels, users
hold the power to change the system, and let it evolve according to needs. Through
the underlying rules of the cryptoeconomic system, incentives, punishments, and
constraints can be co-designed [73]. They will co-evolve under the control of the
users.
In summary, the new paradigm of the Finance 4.0 system opens new pathways that
the current monetary system does not offer. It allows for monetary innovation by ‘in-
vitro’ experiments exploring the post-fiat-monetary design space. I hope communi-
ties around the world will benefit from this chapter by finding and choosing, creating,
and nurturing a prosperous economic system that respects their socio-ecological
goals.
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Qualified Money—A Better Financial
System for the Future
Dirk Helbing
Abstract Over millennia, people have seen the financial system collapse again and
again. It is, therefore, time to re-invent money and the financial system altogether
in order to make them fit for the complex world of today. Here, it is described how
the idea for a new socio-ecological finance system came about. Three main inno-
vations are proposed: (1) a particular combination of cash and electronic money,
which promotes electronic transactions, while preserving privacy, where it is justi-
fied and needed; (2) money that has additional qualifiers such as reputation, which
may depend on the geographic region, the exchange history, or other variables; (3)
multidimensional money, which is better suited to manage complex systems such
as our economy, and enables (the design of) self-organizing systems with favorable
properties, e.g., economic systems that promote a co-evolutionary processes toward
a circular economy.
From Money to Bitcoin and Beyond
To discuss the future of money, let us look back a little bit. By inventing a universally
interchangeable good, the historical invention of money made the exchange of goods
much easier. But while money was based on valuable materials such as gold in the
beginning, it was later increasingly replaced by symbolic values, such as paper bills,
or even entries in a digital account. Now, money is created in great amounts not only
by central banks. Normal banks do it as well. If, one day, we don’t trust anymore
that we will get valuable goods in exchange, it is obvious that the value of money
This chapter describes how the Finance 4.0 idea (also abbreviated by FIN4, FIN4+, or FIN+) was
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will be gone. This process is known as “hyper-inflation.” In human history, this has
happened many times.
Bitcoin is an attempt to avoid that such a horrible scenario can happen again.
It’s a peer-to-peer payment system, which does not require banks anymore. But it
has other problems. Bitcoins are designed such that the overall amount of digital
currency is slowly growing and saturating, thereby establishing something like a
new “gold standard.” However, in history, a classical gold standard alone has not
been flexible enough for a resilient financial system.1 If the volume of money grows
more quickly than economic output, therewill eventually be inflation. Then, the value
of money, i.e., its purchasing power, will drop. Conversely, if the volume of money
does not grow as quickly as productivity, one may run into another problem, called
“deflation.” Then, money becomes more valuable over time, and people would hoard
rather than spend it, as they can buy goods more cheaply in the future. Under such
conditions, business cannot thrive. So, the volumeofmoney should growproportional
to productivity, at least on average. Let me add though that the above dependencies
regarding inflation and deflation are expected to hold only on the long run. Central
banks and other stakeholders can manipulate financial markets, which may create
delayed adjustments, biases, and abnormal market behaviors. As a consequence, it
becomes increasingly difficult to interpret market signals correctly and to respond to
them in a proper way. On the long run, I think, loss of control is almost inevitable.
A New Kind of Money: How the Idea Was Born
For the above reasons and due to the large amount of energy consumed, Bitcoin will
not be the final solution, but the technological concept that is behind it will probably
guide the way for future currencies and other services requiring secure transactions.
Altogether, however, we need to fundamentally re-invent money, it is not adaptive
enough for our complex world. We have to ask ourselves, why the financial system
keeps crashing since thousands of years, and what is fundamentally wrong with the
way we have set it up.
Thinking about this for a couple of years, I came to the conclusion that even
though money is a great invention, it’s outdated. Therefore, it’s time to create a
better one. The argument is as follows: Currently, money is a scalar, i.e., the simplest
mathematical quantity one can think of. It is neither multi-dimensional nor does
it have a memory. But mathematics offers a much richer spectrum of concepts
to define exchange processes, such as multi-dimensional quantities, e.g., vectors,
1To make the gold standard more flexible, one could create gold-backed digital money with a
time stamp. This would allow one to introduce “artificial aging” of money. In other words, such
money would be most valuable when handed out, but it would lose its value exponentially over
time. However, the same amount of money that would be lost in this way would be newly gener-
ated, for example, for the payment of basic income and investment premiums, see https://www.
springerprofessional.de/democratic-capitalism/18842560 or http://futurict.blogspot.com/2020/07/
democratic-capitalism-why-not-give-it.html.
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tensors, matrices, or network graphs. In fact, money comes from somewhere and
goes somewhere else. Who transfers money to whom defines a network of money
flows. Therefore, money should be represented by network quantities. And money
should be multi-dimensional to allow other things to happen apart from the eternal
ups and downs.
This made me think about “Qualified Money”—multi-dimensional money with
a memory. Since Roman times, people have said: “Money doesn’t stink!” In other
words, it does not matter where it comes from and how it is earned. However, what
if we could give it a scent, like a perfume? And what if this would co-determine the
value of money? In a discussion during a visit in Zurich, my colleagues Tobias Preis,
DavidRand, andOle Peterswere fascinated by this idea. Later on, I combined itwith a
reputation system and called the new concept “QualifiedMoney.” Such money could
earn reputation and, with this, additional value! This approach has commonalities
with local currencies, but it is more general and relates to the way, modern stock
markets work. However, Qualified Money opens entirely new possibilities.
What’s Wrong with Our Financial Architecture?
One of the problems of today’s financial system is the possibility of cascading effects.
What started as a local problem in the Californian real estate market became a world
financial and economic crisis, eventually causing social and political unrests. But
how could it come that far? For this, see the Fig. 1 below. The world financial system
lacks engineered breaking points to stop cascades. At home, every one of us has
electrical fuses to make sure that a local electrical overload would not cause a larger
problem, e.g., the house to burn down. In the financial system, however, the strategy
is just the opposite: to ease the load on troubled banks, some of their problems have
been taken on by the states, which are now in trouble as well, and so on. Rather
than isolating infected “patients” and curing them by an intensive care program,
one infected many other countries that were healthy before. In this way, the overall
damage became much larger than it could have been, and it is not clear how we will
ever recover from the resulting debt levels. If we don’t get the problems solved any
time soon, cultural values such as tolerance and solidarity, or even peace might be
in danger. It’s now the very fabric of our society, which is at stake. In societies with
mass unemployment, it can take two generations or more until the good relationships
between citizens and their state and a healthy social structure recovers.
What worries even more is the fact that we don’t currently have a backup financial
system. For most other systems that may fail, we have contingency plans—a “plan
B” or “plan C.” In fact, one might argue that one reason why our current financial
system performs badly is the absence of competing financial systems. Given that we
believe in competition,why don’twe take this seriously and build alternative systems,
which could also serve as backups, as plans B or C? It’s not enough to complain
about having to bail out banks and about lacking alternatives. I also doubt that






























































































Fig. 1 How cascading effects in financial markets can come about
regulations best, while small- and medium-sized banks struggle with them, these
regulations may cause big banks to grow even bigger. Therefore, we should rather
promote alternatives. In fact, with Bitcoin and peer-to-peer lending systems, some
alternatives are eventually emerging, but we need more and better ones.
At the moment, I would say that we cannot take it for granted that the current
financial system will still work in 10 or 20 years from now. Most industrial states
have debts of the order of 100% of the gross domestic product (GDP), sometimes
even a multiple of this. Controlled inflation has been considered to be a recipe to
reduce these debts. The trick can work, if applied by a single country or just a few
ones. However, if the USA, Europe, China, Japan, and further countries are all trying
to reduce their debts in such a way at the same time, this may trigger an inflationary
spiral that can get out of hand.
Besides, the attempts of central banks to control the level of inflation haven’t
worked well so far. To save banks, to encourage investments into the real economy,
and to increase the level of inflation, central banks have pumped massive, almost
unimaginable amounts of money into the financial markets (under labels such as
“quantitative easing”). However, as it turns out, years after the financial crisis started,
many problems have still not been sorted out.
Why is this? Banks often do not trust that companies would pay their loans
back and, besides, they need more capitalization themselves. Most money created
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by the central banks does not reach the companies in need. Instead, given the low
interest rates, money is mainly invested in financial markets. This drives up stock
prices even when real economic growth is negligible or negative. Rising stock prices
create further incentives for virtual investments at the stock markets rather than real
investments into companies. Consequently, central banks have created a gigantic
bubble in the financial markets. In some sense, a virtual inflation has happened
over there—the stocks have become more expensive even though most companies
haven’t grown. When this stock market bubble bursts, a large fraction of the money
will flee into real values. This will suddenly drive enormous price inflation, as there
are not enoughmaterial values that these huge amounts of money can buy. Therefore,
inflation might easily get out of control. So far, this did not happen, as misleading
incentives have caused a temporary allocation of money in the stock markets. In
the meantime, however, low interest rates are undermining the perspectives of life
insurances and pension funds.
An Unfeasible Control Problem
I have argued above that the central banks haven’t been able to reach the effects they
wanted. But this is not because they wouldn’t be competent. It’s because the control
problem they are faced with is ill-defined—it’s literally unsolvable. The reason is
that they don’t have enough instruments or, to put it differently, not enough control
variables. The central banks can increase the volume of money, and they can change
the interest rate. That’s basically it. They may also buy and sell bonds, but many
think they shouldn’t. The classical instruments of central banks are apparently not
sufficient to do the job. In other words, the weapons of central banks are blunt.
New possibilities are urgently needed, and this basically means additional ways of
adaptation.
Why is this so? Let’s take an example from the world of taxes. Apart from raising
money for public investments, taxes are often used to incentivize or discourage
certain kinds of behaviors. For example, many countries have taxes on cigarettes,
alcohol, and fuel, to reduce their consumption. Theymay also offer tax reductions for
investments into environmental-friendly heating, better home insulation, or buying
solar panels, to promote the production of renewable energy. It is clear that each of
these goals can be achieved by suitable taxation-based incentives. But what happens
if one simultaneously tries to reach many goals by one single “control variable,”
the overall amount of money to be paid for taxes? One may end up investing into
solar energy production, while smoking more cigarettes, which altogether would not
change the individual tax level. So, on average, people may not be very responsive to
a multitude of rewards and sanctions. In other words, we are unlikely to reach many
goals with a single control variable such as one-dimensional money.
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More “Control Variables” Needed
This problem is actually well-known from control theory. For example, complex
chemical production processes cannot be steered by a single control variable such as
the temperature or the concentrationof a certain chemical ingredient. In a complicated
production process, one must be able to control many different variables, such as the
pressure and the concentrations of all ingredients. It is also instructive to compare
this with ecosystems. The plant and animal life in a place will not just be determined
by a single control variable such as the amount of water, but also by the temperature,
humidity, and various kinds of nutrients such as oxygen, nitrogen, and phosphor.
Our bodies, too, require many kinds of vitamins and nutrients to be healthy. So, why
should our economic system be different? Why shouldn’t a healthy financial system
need several kinds of money?
If we had different kinds of money, we could probably influence how much of
the money handed out by central banks is finally used by companies for real invest-
ments. This would require at least one additional kind of money. So, let us assume
that, besides cash and goods, we would have two kinds of electronic money: “real”
electronicmoney (“REMO”) and “virtual” electronicmoney (“VEM”). For example,
besides real electronic EUROs, we could introduce “AEROs” as virtual electronic
money. By law, cash and real electronic money could be invested into goods and real
investments, but not into financial products. Virtual electronic money, in contrast,
could be invested into financial products, but not into goods. The important point is
now that the central bank could hand out REMO and VEM at different interest rates.
If REMO were handed out at a lower interest rate than VEM, this would incentivize
real investments.
Two Kinds of Electronic Money
Of course, cash, REMO and VEM could be converted into each other. However, by
means of conversion fees, one could also create incentives for one kind of money as
compared to the other(s). This would create new “degrees of freedom”, as a physicist
would say,whichwould enable a better adaptation of the financial system to the actual
needs. For example, if REMO earns some interest rate but cash not, or if cash loses
value due to inflation, this speaks against saving large amounts of cash. It would be
better to spend cash on consumption, or to turn it into REMO or VEM. If lending
REMO is cheaper than lending VEM, it will incentivize real investments over virtual
investments into financial products. If VEM can be converted into REMO for free,
but converting REMO into VEM is costly, this again incentivizes real investments.
So, this little extension of our financial system will allow the central banks to
more effectively stimulate real investments into companies’ production capacities.
Central banks would not have to produce anymore a bubble of cheap money, which
will sooner or later overheat the financial and real estate markets. As we have seen in
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the past, this can cause dangerously large bubbles, which will sooner or later produce
large-scale global damage, when they burst.
Europe’s “Little” Mistake
But we should dare to think one step further. While the economy in the USA and
the UK seems to be recovering from the 2008 financial crash and the subsequent
economic crisis,most of Europe is still not doingwell after several years of struggle—
in fact, some indicators are worse than after the great depression in the 1930s. In
January 2014, Nobel Prize winner Joe Stiglitz (*1943) summarized the situation
in Basel, Switzerland, as follows: before the crisis, Europe was doing very well. It
had some of the strongest economies in the world, it had some of the best public
infrastructures, best education systems, best health systems, and social systems.
However, Europe did a “little” mistake: without creating a sufficiently sophisticated
institutional framework, it introduced a new currency, the EURO, which replaced
more than a dozen other currencies. Altogether, this created more problems than
benefits, he judged.
We are not talking here about the widespread complaint of citizens that the intro-
duction of the EURO made life more expensive—be it justified or not. Instead, we
must talk about the fact that, if we compare all countries on a one-dimensional scale
such as the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, therewill be alwayswinners and
losers. In this case, Germany happens to be a winner and Greece a loser, but it could
have been different as well. We must recognize that, given the different productivity
of the countries, it was just a matter of time until economic forces were unleashed,
which required adjustments. In the past, such adjustments happened naturally by
adapting the currency exchange rates. Now, in more than 15 European countries, this
is not possible anymore. This problem can again be solved by adding new “degrees
of freedom”, or, as other people say, new “control variables”. But how to introduce
these variables without giving up the EURO, which many consider an important
peace-building project in Europe?
Vitamins for the Financial System
In the following, I will suggest to introduce “QualifiedMoney.” QualifiedMoney has
a number of different qualifiers, which turn money into a multi-dimensional means
of exchange. The value of QualifiedMoney is not only given by its amount, but also a
conversion factor that depends on various qualities. For example, if one decided that
geographic origin should be a qualifier, one would enable country-specific EUROs,
allowing adjustments of the value of money to the respective economic strength. The
same approach can be used to define regional or local currencies, if desired. So, one
could save the prestige project of the “EURO” by making the currency more flexible.
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The regional variants of EUROs would be converted into each other similarly as we
are currently doing it for different kinds of currencies at the stock markets, such as
EUROs, DOLLARs, or YENs.
However, Qualified Money would not have to be connected to local origin. The
concept has potential for extension. For example, the unemployment rate, theMillen-
nium development goals, or any socio-economic-environmental factors considered
relevant for human well-being could be used to define qualifiers. In our lives, it’s not
just money that matters. People care about many things, and this opens up entirely
new possibilities!
We Could All Be Doing Well
It is important to recognize that both, the self-organization and management of
complex dynamical systems, require sufficiently many control variables, not just
one. Establishing different kinds of money would serve this purpose. Compared to
the currency system we have today, these different kinds of money would not be
easily convertible. There would be an adjustable conversion tax or fee, to discourage
conversion and to encourage earning different kinds of money, instead. This would
naturally extend the approach we have discussed before (in connection with VEM
and REMO), and it would create a multi-dimensional incentive system, rewarding
us for different kinds of efforts, including social and environmental ones.
Of course, such a conversion tax or fee would create something like “friction” in
the multi-dimensional money system. However, we know from physics that friction
can enable important functionality. Howwould it be to have such amulti-dimensional
money and exchange system? Depending on how many dimensions we allow for,
everyone could be doing well, each one on the dimensions fitting his or her personal
strengths, skills, or expertise.
Today, we have many ranking systems to compensate for the lack of such a
multi-dimensional money system. Besides the Fortune 500 list of richest persons,
we rank tennis players and soccer players. Others collect medals or decorations, or
even scores in computer games. Scientists enjoy citations earned by publications...
Even though some of these ranking scales don’t imply any material value, they can
motivate people to make an effort. Hence, we can use such incentive mechanisms
to create a multi-dimensional reward system, as we need it to enable self-organizing
socio-economic systems.
One might even consider the possibility to allow everyone to establish a certain
number of own currencies. In a sense, this would be the logical next step after
allowing banks and Bitcoin (not just central banks) to create money. The value of
these personalized currencies would then depend on how much others trust in them
and are willing to engage in related value exchanges. I assume that, after some time,
there would be just a reasonably small number of successful currencies that are
widely used. However, they might have some interesting new properties compared
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to the currencies we have today. Therefore, opening up money creation to innovation
might be really worthwhile.
Money with a Memory
Let us now assume that electronic money would be traceable. In this case, we could
give electronic money a “memory,” and we could make its value dependent on its
transaction history. To put it in simple terms, money that went through the hands of
Albert Einstein or JohnF.Kennedy could havemore value thanmoney thatwas earned
with “blood diamonds.” So, possible qualifiers could be, how the money was earned,
its origin or destination location, the reputation of the products bought, or the repu-
tation of the producer or seller. Hence, we can further differentiate electronic money
by means of additional qualifiers. This might be imagined as treating money units
like stocks or like individual currencies. In other words, a (reputation-dependent)
conversion factor would apply, when financial transactions are made.
Benefits of Money with Reputation
I recognize that some people might feel uneasy about money becoming dependent on
reputation. However, in some sense, this is already happening when we go shopping
on the Internet. Depending on the country we live in, the type of computer we are
using, and perhaps further personal qualifiers such as income, we might get different
product offers than others, at different prices. This is part of the logic of personalized
recommender systems. One might find it upsetting to pay a higher price than others,
but it could also be a lower one. When we book an airplane ticket or a hotel room,
we receive different offers, too, depending on when we book and where we book,
and whether we are regular customers or not.
In any case, there are quite some benefits of reputation-based Qualified Money.
For example, it becomes easier for producers and stores to sell high-quality products
at a higher price. Furthermore, to get an idea how future shopping might look like,
assume that there is a database, in which information about products is stored, such
as the amount of money to be paid, ingredients, durability, level of environmental-
friendly production, level of socially friendly production, andmuchmore. In addition,
let’s assume our smartphones know our preferences, for example, that we give the
price a weight of 50%, environmental-friendliness a weight of 30%, and fair produc-
tion a weight of 20%, and that we want to avoid products with particular ingredients
we are allergic against. Then, by scanning product codes and retrieving the related
product information, our smartphone will recommend us the best fitting products.2
2Such a platform for more sustainable consumption has been presented in a recent publication:
T. Asikis, J. Klinglmayr, D. Helbing and E. Pournaras, How value-sensitive design can empower
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Furthermore, if customers were willing to share their preference settings, producers
and sellers could better tailor their assortment of products to the customer wishes.
Therefore, customers would benefit as well. They would get more products they
would really like to have.
Balancing Transparency and Anonymity
If properly set up, Qualified Money can create a good balance between transparency
and anonymity, such that we can have the benefits of both. Transparency can promote
more responsible and desirable behavior. It allows ethical values and higher quality
to survive in a framework of free economic competition. In fact, a considerable
fraction of people cares about ethics and fair products. Even financial investors are
getting interested in ethical investments, as they tend to be more sustainable. At
the moment, we often find ourselves in a situation, where the competition between
companies is so harsh that they have to reduce production costs. This can sooner
or later decrease salary levels, production standards, product quality, and/or sustain-
ability. In the end, we may have lower salary levels or lower-quality products. Both
will eventually impact producers as well. In contrast, reputation mechanisms could
stop the undesirable downward spiral, by rewarding higher quality products and fairer
production.
The question is, whether the transparency needed for such reputation systems
will ever be reached? In fact, there is currently a trend toward more transparency
of money flows. We have recently seen (some of) the Swiss banking secrecy melt
away. Several times, whistleblowers have sold confidential information about private
accounts to public authorities. “Off-Shore Leaks” has made international money
flows more transparent as well. Furthermore, there seems to be a “follow the money”
program that tracks individual money transactions. And presently, many countries
set up agreements for an automatic information exchange allowing public authorities
to monitor money flows and to check tax declarations.
Anonymous money exchange is under attack for similar reasons as anonymous
information exchange: In many cases, it has promoted crime and misery. Neverthe-
less, anonymity has still important roles to play. Most of us don’t want others to
know, what medicine we buy in a pharmacy. For such and further reasons, we should
still have some amount of cash besides traceable electronic money, even though it
should lose its value quickly enough to make traceable transactions more attractive
than cash.
It should be also remembered that anonymity is one of the most important
elements of democracies. The principle of anonymous vote is needed for inde-
pendent decision-making, which is a precondition for the “wisdom of crowds” to
sustainable consumption, Royal Society Open Science 8: 201418 (2021); see also the video
accessible at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uur5BXXspgI.
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work. Academic peer review as well is based on anonymity, to support open criti-
cism without fear of revenge. Organized crime or corruption would also be difficult
to fight without protecting the anonymity of witnesses. So, neither full transparency
nor full anonymity canwork.We need a system that makes it possible to combine and
balance both principles. Introducing Qualified Money besides cash is the solution!
How this would work is described in more detail in an invention,3 a FuturICT
blog on Democratic Capitalism,4 as well as the main part of this book on “Finance
4.0” and its Appendix on the “Interaction Support Processor”.
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing,
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published in D. Helbing, Next Civilization (Springer, 2021).
A “Social Bitcoin” Could Sustain
a Democratic Digital World
Kaj-Kolja Kleineberg and Dirk Helbing
Abstract A multidimensional financial system could provide benefits for individ-
uals, companies, and states. Instead of top-down control, which is destined to even-
tually fail in a hyperconnected world, a bottom-up creation of value can unleash
creative potential and drive innovations. Multiple currency dimensions can repre-
sent different externalities and thus enable the design of incentives and feedback
mechanisms that foster the ability of complex dynamical systems to self-organize
and lead to a more resilient society and sustainable economy. Modern information
and communication technologies play a crucial role in this process, as Web 2.0 and
online social networks promote cooperation and collaboration on unprecedented
scales. Within this contribution, we discuss how one dimension of a multidimen-
sional currency system could represent socio-digital capital (Social Bitcoins) that
can be generated in a bottom-up way by individuals who perform search and navi-
gation tasks in a future version of the digital world. The incentive to mine Social
Bitcoins could sustain digital diversity, whichmitigates the risk of totalitarian control
by powerful monopolies of information and can create new business opportunities
needed in times where a large fraction of current jobs is estimated to disappear due
to computerization.
Modern Socio-Economic Challenges Require a New
Approach
Nowadays, we are facing a number of serious problems such as financial instabilities,
an unsustainable economy and related global warming, the lack of social coopera-
tion and collaboration causing the rise of conflict, terrorism and war. Traditional
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approaches to remedy such problems are based on top-down control. Whereas in
the past this way of thinking worked reasonably well, the high interconnectivity
in modern systems will eventually but unavoidably lead to its failure as systems
become uncontrollable by central entities due to stronger internal effects, leading to
often unpredictable cascading behavior [1] and catastrophic failures [2].
Instead of entirely top-down-based approaches, designingmechanisms to promote
desired results like increased cooperation, coordination, and better resource effi-
ciency could help to deal with current socio-economic challenges. Importantly, a
multidimensional incentive system is needed to design the desired interactions and
appropriate feedback mechanisms [3, 4]. Such incentives have to be implemented in
a bottom-upway, allowing systems to self-organize [5] and thus promoting creativity,
innovation, and diversity [6].
Diversity acts as a motor of innovation, can promote collective intelligence [7],
and is fundamental for the resilience of society [8, 9]. This renders socio-economic
and cultural diversity equally important as biodiversity. The importance of diversity,
however, is not restricted to individual, cultural, social, or economic domains. For
instance, diversity among digital services in competition for the attention of users
can mitigate the risk of totalitarian control and manipulation by extremely powerful
monopolies of information. As we explain in Sect. 3.3, the loss of diversity in the
digitalworld can lead to a systematic and irreversible collapse of the digital ecosystem
[10, 11], akin to the loss of biodiversity in the physical ecosystem. Such a collapse
can have dramatic consequences for the freedom of information and eventually for
the freedomof society. In this contribution, we showhow such a catastrophic collapse
could be avoided on a systematic level by introducing a multidimensional incentive
system in which an appropriately designed cryptocurrency provides an incentive for
individuals to perform certain tasks in their socio-digital environment. We refer to
this cryptocurrency as “Social Bitcoins.” 1
Importantly, to successfully meet these challenges, tools, ideas, and concepts
from complexity science have to be combined with technologies like the blockchain,
economic knowledge (and potentially Internet of Things technology to measure
“externalities”).
A Multidimensional Financial System
The invention of money has led to unprecedented wealth and has provided countless
benefits for society. However, the current monetary system is not appropriate any
more to control highly interconnected dynamical complex systems like the ones our
economy and financial system nowadays form. Whereas such systems are in general
difficult to control and understand and nearly impossible to predict, they exhibit the
1The details of the implementation of such a cryptocurrency are beyond the scope of this
contribution.
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tendency to self-organize [5, 12]. New approaches to face today’s challenges should
therefore take advantage of this system intrinsic tendency.
Central banks like the ECB can control the amount of money in the market by
means ranging from adjusting interest rates to quantitative easing. Recently, the
ECB has lowered interest rates to the lowest value of all time (even introducing
negative rates for some bank deposits [13]) and has further increased its efforts to
buy government bonds [14]. These measures are intended to boost economy and
increase inflation in the Euro zone to the target of 2%. Despite these efforts, inflation
has remained close to 0%, raising doubts about the capacity to act and the credibility
of the ECB [15]. Furthermore, liquidity pumped into the market does not reach
efficiently enough the real economy. As a consequence recently “helicopter money”
has been discussed as a possible solution [16, 17]. Importantly, these problems are
not limited to the Euro zone. For example, due to the interconnected nature of our
economic and financial systems, the state of the global economy limits the decisions
the Fed can take concerning a raise of interest rates, as such a raise could pose a
threat for the global economy [18].
The problem is that the current monetary system provides only a one-dimensional
control variable. Let us consider the human body and how it self-organizes as an
example. To ensure its healthy function, it is not enough to adjust only the amount of
water one drinks. Instead, the body needs water, air, carbohydrate, different proteins
and vitamins, mineral nutrients, and more. None of these needs can be replaced by
another. Why should this be different in systems like our economy, the financial
system, or society?
Indeed, a multidimensional currency system could help to solve the problems
mentioned above, where the different dimensions can be converted at a low (or
negligible) cost. Such multidimensional incentive system could be used to promote
self-organization of financial and economic systems in a bottom-up way [19]. This
opens the door to “Capitalism 2.0” and “Finance 4.0” (see [20–23] for details).
A special case of a multidimensional incentive system is “qualified money.” The
concept was first introduced by Dirk Helbing in [19, 22]. Instead of a scalar (one-
dimensional) quantity, like the Euro or any other currency, money could be multidi-
mensional and earn its own reputation. To illustrate this, consider the example that
there were two dimensions of money. By law, the first could only be invested into
real values, but not into financial products. Instead, the latter dimension could. There
would be an exchange rate (and cost) to convert one dimension into the other. As
a consequence, the ECB could increase the amount of money for real investments
directly, hence avoiding the problem mentioned earlier. In other words, the decision
space onwhich institutions like the ECB can act would considerably increasewithout
them acting outside of their mandate. Qualified money, which could be realized in a
Bitcoin-like [24] way,2 could earn its own reputation depending on how and where it
was created and what businesses it supports. The reputation then can give the money
2That means, transactions are transparent. It is important to have a dimension of qualified money
which cannot be tracked, and this dimension should lose value more rapidly to incentive spending
it soon. See [22] for details.
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more or less value, which can lead to a more sustainable economy as sustainability
would become measurable and transparent to individuals (for details see [20, 22]).
The concept of qualified money is not limited to the above-described two dimen-
sions. Instead, everything people care about can be represented by a dimension in the
currency vector. As we explain in the following, one dimension of qualified money
could be socio-digital capital that can be acquired in the digital world.
Modern information and communication technologies play an important role
in facing today’s challenges. Indeed, nowadays the digital and physical world are
strongly interdependent and cannot be treated in isolation any more [1]. The huge
success of Web 2.0 and online social networks is changing the way humans interact
at a global scale. They promote cooperation and collaboration on unprecedented
scales, but at the same time powerful monopolies of information have the power
to alter individuals’ emotions and decisions [25, 26]. Supercomputers nowadays
perform a large fraction of all financial transactions, hence influencing the prices of
important commodities, which can lead to starving, conflicts, war, etc. Information
and communication technologies thus are both a crucial part of the problems society
has to solve as well as a fundamental and promising piece of the solution.
Decentralized Information Architectures and Qualified
Money: A Social Bitcoin
Decentralized Architectures
The existence of powerful monopolies of information like big IT-companies or even
some governments can lead to the loss of control by individuals, companies, or
states. Besides, the economic damage attributed to cybercrime is growing expo-
nentially and is estimated to reach 2.1 trillion dollars in 2019 [27]. Hence, it is
time to design more resilient information and communication technologies that—by
design—cannot be exploited by single entities. Decentralized architectures naturally
provide these benefits [28–30].
Social Bitcoins and Web 4.0
As explained earlier, the main idea behind qualified money is to price a broader
spectrum of externalities. This means that it can be applied to, for instance, informa-
tion. This can be realized in many different ways. The exact details would probably
emerge in a self-organizedway, depending on choices and preferences of individuals.
But how could such a system look like and what benefits would it provide? Here, we
discuss a possible vision in which one dimension of qualified money, socio-digital
capital, can be priced in terms of Social Bitcoins that can bemined using online social
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networks and digital infrastructures. It is impossible to foresee the exact details of
such a system; nevertheless, in the following, we will sketch a possible vision of a
future Internet and digitalworld inwhich individuals perform the routing ofmessages
and information using their social contacts and technological connections rather than
relying on service providers.
The use of the Internet has changed fundamentally since its invention. At first,
it was a collection of static web pages. Then, Web 2.0 emerged as “a collabora-
tive medium, a place where we [could] all meet and read and write” [31]. Conse-
quently, Web 3.0 constitutes a “Semantic Web” [31], where data can be processed by
machines. Let us refer to a digital world inwhich information ismanaged in a bottom-
up way, free of central monopolies in control of the vast majority of information,
as Web 4.0.3 A digital democracy [28], if you will. Assume that this digital world
was composed of many interacting, decentralized systems, which—in the absence
of central control compete for the attention of individuals [10, 11]. As we explain
in Sect. 3.3, such a state is possible but fragile. Now assume that, in the future of
the Internet, each individual routes information using their social and technological
connections rather than relying on service providers.4 In decentralized architectures,
this task has to be performed relying only on local knowledge. As shown in [33],
this type of routing can be performed very efficiently and—most importantly—can
be perfected if individuals actively use multiple networks simultaneously.5 This fact
constitutes an important starting point to design appropriate incentives to sustain
digital democracy.
Assume that individuals could earn Social Bitcoins by routing information in the
way explained above. These Social Bitcoins would form a dimension of qualified
money [19, 20, 22] and could (with some additional cost) be exchanged and hence
converted into other dimensions of the currency vector. Their exchange rate would
depend on the trust individuals have in the system and how much they value their
socio-digital environment.
The important point is that now individuals have an incentive to route information
(“mining” Social Bitcoins). As a consequence, individuals will optimize to some
extend their capabilities to perform this action. As explained above and shown in
[33], the routing success can be increased and even perfected if individuals actively
use many networks simultaneously.6 Hence, the introduction of a Social Bitcoin
would constitute an incentive to be active in several networks, as illustrated in Fig. 1.
In addition, search and navigation tasks taking place in less active networks could
increase the reputation of the mined Social Bitcoins, providing further incentive to
engage in less active networks. In other words, sustainability in the digital world
3In [32] Web 4.0 is described as follows: “Web 4.0 will be as a read-write-execution concurrency
web with intelligent interactions, but there is still no exact definition of it. Web 4.0 is also known
as symbiotic web in which human mind and machines can interact in symbiosis.”
4It is important to note that this new type of information routing requires efficient and secure
encryption to ensure privacy of individuals, whenever they wish so.
5This is only the case if the different networks are related such that they exhibit geometric
correlations. As shown in [33], real systems obey this condition.
6In addition, there are other aspects individuals might optimize, see for instance [34].
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Fig. 1 Illustration of the incentive to mine Social Bitcoins. Social Bitcoins form one dimension
of qualified money and can be mined by performing search and navigation tasks using social and
technological connections in a future digital world. Hence, acquiring Social Bitcoins constitutes
an incentive to perform routing. Individuals optimize their strategy to route information and will
be active simultaneously in more networks, as this (among other aspects [34]) increases routing
performance [33]. Performing routing in less active networks could increase the reputation of the
mined Social Bitcoins, providing an additional incentive to engage in less active networks. This
then could sustain digital diversity [10, 11] and at the same time increase the performance of routing
could be priced and would become transparent to individuals who then could adjust
their behavior accordingly. Importantly, as we explain in detail in the following, this
optimization could make digital diversity robust and sustainable.
How a Social Bitcoin Could Sustain Digital Diversity
Here, we present a mathematical model to illustrate the potential effect of a Social
Bitcoin. Asmentioned earlier, many digital services compete for the attention of indi-
viduals. In this context, the attention of users can be considered a scarce resource,
and hence, the digital world forms a complex ecosystem in which networks represent
competing species. A concise description of the digital ecology was developed in
[10]. In a nutshell, multiple online social networks compete for the attention of indi-
viduals in addition to obeying their intrinsic evolutionary dynamics. This dynamics
is given by two main mechanisms, the influence of mass media and a viral spreading
dynamics actingon topof pre-existingunderlyingoffline social networks [35]. Impor-
tantly, the parameter that quantifies the strength of viral spreading, λ, determines the
final fate of the network. If λ is below a critical value λc, the network will eventually
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become entirely passive, which corresponds to the death of the network. On the other
hand, for λ > λc, the activity of the network is sustained [35, 36]. The competition
between multiple networks can be modeled assuming that more active networks are
more attractive to users. Hence, the total virality, which reflects the overall involve-
ment of individuals in online social networks, is distributed between the different
networks as a function of their activities. More active networks obtain a higher share
of the virality, which then makes these networks more active. Note that this induces a
rich-get-richer effect. Interestingly, despite this positive feedback loop, diminishing
returns induced by the network dynamics allows for a stable coexistence (digital
diversity) of several networks in a certain parameter range (we refer the reader to
[10] for details).
The system can be described by the following meanfield equations7
ρ̇ai = ρai
{
λ〈k〉ωi (ρa)[1 − ρai ] − 1
}
, i = 1, . . . , n, (1)
where ρai denotes the fraction active users in network i, λ is the total virality
mentioned earlier, and 〈k〉 denotes the mean degree of network, i.e., the average
number of connections each node has. The weights ωi (ρa) depend on the activi-
ties in all networks, ρa = (ρa1 , ρa2 , . . . , ρan ), and govern the distribution of virality
between different networks. In [10] the authors used ωi (ρa) = [ρai ]σ /
∑n
j=1 [ρaj ]σ ,
where σ denotes the activity affinity that quantifies howmuchmore prone individuals
are to engage in more active networks.
As mentioned earlier, assume that the introduction of Social Bitcoins incentivizes
users to simultaneously usemultiple networks in order to increase their capabilities to
successfully perform search and navigation tasks and hence increase their expected
payoff. The exact form of this incentive depends on the details of the implementation
of the systems’ architectures and Social Bitcoins, which comprises an interesting
future research direction. Here, we model the additional tendency of individuals to
engage inmultiple (and less active) networks by shifting theweight of the distribution
of the virality toward networkswith lower activity, hence hindering the rich-get-richer


























i denotes the mean activity among all networks.
7In the framework of [10], these equations are the result of taking the limit of ν → ∞, where v
describes the ratio between the rate at which the viral spreading and the influence of mass media
occur. As shown in [10], taking this limit has no impact on the stability of the system.
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The effect of the inclusion of the new term (“Social Bitcoin incentive”) in Eq. (2)
can change the behavior of the system dramatically if ξ is large enough, which we
illustrate8 for two competing networks. Let us first consider the case of ξ = 0.2. In
this case, the qualitative behavior of the system is similar to the one in absence of
Social Bitcoins as described in [10]. Below a critical value of the activity affinity,
σ < σc, coexistence is possible (solid green central branch in Fig. 2 (top) and central
green diamond in Fig. 2 (middle, left)), but—once lost—cannot be recovered.
To illustrate this, assume that we start with σ < σc, and the system approaches
the coexistence solution (central green diamond in Fig. 3 (middle, left)). Then, we
change σ to some value larger than σc. Hence, the coexistence solution becomes
unstable and the system eventually approaches the solution where either ρ 1 = 0 or
ρ 2 = 0 (green diamonds in Fig. 2 (middle, right)). Now, after changing σ back to a
value below σc, the system does not return to the again stable coexistence state, but
instead remains in the domination state, which is also stable (outer green diamonds
in Fig. 2 (middle, left)). This example is illustrated in Fig. 2 (bottom), where we
explicitly show the evolution of the fraction of active users for both networks.9 To
conclude, the system is fragile in the sense that an irreversible loss of digital diversity
is possible—similar to the loss of biodiversity.
Interestingly, for a higher value of ξ the behavior of the systemdiffers dramatically,
which we illustrate here for ξ = 1. The solution corresponding to equal coexistence
of two networks, hence ρ1 = ρ2 = 0, is stable as before for values of σ below
some critical value σc. However, in this regime now the domination solutions (ρ1 =
0 ∨ ρ2 = 0, denoted by the red squares in Fig. 3 (middle, left)) are unstable. This
means that, independently from the initial conditions, in this regime the system
always approaches the coexistence solution. For σ > σc, the equal coexistence
solution becomes unstable and new stable solutions emerge (green diamonds in Fig. 3
(middle, right)). These unequal coexistence solutions correspond to the case that one
network has a significantly higher activity than the other, but the activities of both
networks are sustained. Let us again consider the explicit example of two networks
and start with σ > σc. The system approaches the equal coexistence solution (green
square in Fig. 3 (middle, left)). Then, we change σ to some value above σc. Now,
the system approaches the unequal coexistence solution (green diamonds in Fig. 3
(middle, right)), but now the activity in both networks is sustained. By lowering
σ again below σc, the system recovers the equal coexistence solution, in contrast
to the previous case. This example is shown in Fig. 3 (bottom) where we present
the fraction of active users in both networks. To conclude, in contrast to the case
discussed before, the system is robust in the sense that an irreversible loss of digital
diversity cannot occur.
8Here we present only a brief discussion of the dynamical system given by Eqs. (1) and (2). A more
detailed analysis and the investigation of different forms of the incentive term in Eq. (2) is left for
future research.
9Note that here we describe an idealized system without noise. Noise in real systems would speed
up significantly the separation of the trajectories in Fig. 2 (bottom) shortly after the first dashed
gray line.
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Fig. 2 Fragility of digital diversity. Here, we consider two networks, λ〈k〉= 2 and ξ = 0.2. Top:
bifurcation diagram (subcritical pitchfork bifurcation). ρai denotes the fraction of active users in
network i. Green solid lines represent stable solutions and red dashed lines correspond to unstable
fixed points. Middle: streamline plots for σ = 0.75 (left) and σ = 1.5 (right). Bottom: evolution of
the system for initial conditions ρa1 = 0.4, ρa2 = 0.3. For 15 ≤ t < 45 (between the dashed lines)
we set σ = 1.5, and otherwise, we set σ = 0.75
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Fig. 3 Robustness of digital diversity. Here, we consider two networks, λ〈k〉= 2 and ξ = 1.0. Top:
bifurcation diagram. ρai denotes the fraction of active users in network i. Green solid lines represent
stable solutions and red dashed lines correspond to unstable fixed points. For better readability, here
we do not show the unstable fixed points for ρa1 = 0 and ρa2 = 0. Middle: streamline plots for σ= 0.75 (left) and σ = 2.5 (right). Bottom: evolution of the system for initial conditions ρa1 = 0.4,
ρa2 = 0.3. For 30 ≤ t < 80 (between the dashed lines), we set σ = 2.5, and otherwise, we set σ =
1.75
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To sum up, the introduction of a multidimensional incentive system in which one
dimension represents socio-digital capital in terms of Social Bitcoins that can be
mined by performing search and navigation tasks in a future digital world can make
digital diversity robust—given that the value of Social Bitcoins is high enough.
Outlook and Future Research Directions
A multidimensional financial system offers manifold success opportunities for indi-
viduals, companies, and states. Top-down control alone is destined to fail in a hyper-
connected world. Hence, we need a new approach that incorporates the bottom-
up empowerment of society and the right incentives and feedback mechanisms to
promote creativity and innovations. The initiative “A nation of makers” [37] in the
USA as well as the rise of citizen science [38] constitutes promising starting points
for such a development. Nevertheless, increasing financial instabilities emphasize
the pressing need to redesign certain aspects of the financial system, hence the urge
to create “Finance 4.0” [22].
In this perspective, multiple monetary dimensions could represent different exter-
nalities (negative ones like noise, environmental damage, etc., and positive ones such
as recycling of resources, cooperation, creation of new jobs, and so on). Building on
this framework, appropriate feedback and coordination mechanisms could increase
resource efficiency and lead to a more sustainable, circular, cooperative economy.
This canbe achieved in a bottom-upway in termsof an improvedversion of capitalism
based on the abilities of self-organization intrinsically present in dynamical complex
systems by accounting for externalities in a multidimensional incentive system. The
Internet of Things and the blockchain technology underlying the Bitcoin architecture
provide the technological requirements to realize “Finance 4.0” and “Capitalism 2.0”
based on knowledge from the science of complex systems [20–23, 39].
Nowadays, the digital and physical world are strongly interdependent. We have
presented an example how amultidimensional incentive system, in particular a Social
Bitcoin generated in a bottom-up way by performing search and navigation tasks in
a possible future digital world can sustain digital diversity, which is essential for
the freedom of information. Furthermore, a diverse digital landscape is expected to
create business opportunities for individuals and companies [4, 21, 39] facing the
disappearance of half of today’s jobs [40]. The price of Social Bitcoins is crucial for
the desired effect of sustaining digital diversity. This price, however, is determined
dynamically by the market and may depend on other dimensions of the currency
system. The development of a concise and general theory of this system and possible
implementations comprise interesting future research directions.
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Abstract This contribution develops the framework of a novel, socio-ecological
finance system that enables the incentivization of environmentally friendly behavior,
socially responsible production, resource recycling, sharing and more. We call this
system Finance 4.0—where Finance 1.0 refers to a physical coin-based system,
Finance 2.0 to a fiat currency system, Finance 3.0 to blockchain finance, while
Finance 4.0 stands for a multi-dimensional, real-time feedback system that combines
blockchain technology with the Internet of Things. Instead of “Finance 4.0,” we will
also often use the abbreviation “FIN4.”
In comparison with citizen scores such as the Chinese social credit score, the
FIN4 approach is different in a variety of aspects:
• FIN4 is not aimed at punishment and control, but rather at helping to encourage,
empower and coordinate sustainable and other favorable action.
• It is being built for local, temporary measurements and feedback, not for global
surveillance and control.
• It seeks to protect the privacy of people rather than to keep information about
everyone and every action forever.
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favorable interactions and our social and environmental goals.
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• With multi-dimensional incentivization, it becomes possible to advance several
goals simultaneously; thereby, manymore people can benefit from the interactions
they engage in, as multi-dimensional value exchange increases the solution space
enormously.
Keywords Blockchain · Sustainability · Decentralized governance · Incentive
system · Value-sensitive design · Cryptoeconomics
The Finance 4.0 Ambition
The world is facing existential threats. These challenges are putting pressure on our
economy, society and environment. The unresolved problems of the 2008 financial
crisis still endanger the economic stability of Europe and the world. Currently, many
nation states struggle to control the power of major banks and global corporations.
We are told to accept they are “too big to fail”—thereby skewing incentives and
creating moral hazards.
Digitization and globalization are increasingly creating an interconnected world.
While this process has brought much progress and improved the standard of living,
it has also produced new threats, in particular a crisis in terms of sustainability.
The globalized economy now comprises a massive, complex network of systems
that is much harder to map and control than the economies of the twentieth century.
One of the critical problems is that today’s economic order is creating systemic
market failures due to all sorts of unwanted externalities. A concerted global effort
to regulate and account for these externalities is yet to be seen. Pricing externalities in
dollars, for example, is not expected to be sufficient. As a result, a series of ecological
and economic crises threaten the very basis upon which our economy and society
are built (Fig. 1).
What is more, access to scarce resources is becoming a growing concern. The
use of fossil fuels and raw materials has tripled in the last 40 years [1], and climate
change may lead to the extinction of one sixth of all species [2]. Not to mention
the additional challenges posed by war, terrorism and the migration of displaced
people. At every scale, individual incentives today are often misaligned with the core
values of our societies. As a consequence, the world suffers from an overall lack of
sustainability. How should we tackle this web of interdependent, complex crises and
mitigate someof the fundamental challenges humanity faces?This iswhere FuturICT
2.0 comes in. The project pursued disruptive innovation to address the root cause
of these problems—a lack of sustainability—by combining the Internet of Things,
blockchain technology and complexity science to open up new opportunities.
In alignment with the UN Sustainable Development Goals (and future iterations
thereof), our proposal called “Finance 4.0” concerns a multi-dimensional incentive
system tomanage complex systems and promote a circular and sharing economy. The
aim is to create a high quality of life for more people with fewer resources by aligning
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Fig. 1 Ecological footprints of selected countries (National Footprint Assessments 2017, Global
Footprint Network)
individual incentives with core values—defined and driven by the communities
themselves.
Finance 4.0 (short FIN4) encompasses a socio-ecological finance system, a novel
economic system and a new social contract. With respect to finance, we propose a
multi-dimensional cryptocurrency ecosystem promoting decentralization and posi-
tive action. Regarding the economy, we suggest a new, privacy-preserving incen-
tivization scheme influencing production and consumption in away that will promote
a circular and sharing economy. This new system should be held together by a new
kind of social contract fostering community-based decision-making, allowing for
subsidiarity as well as local and personal diversity.
FIN4 is democratic, pluralistic and inclusive. It leverages information and commu-
nication systems to empower everyone to take better decisions, be more creative,
and coordinate or cooperate with others—thereby leading to better business models,
products and services, smarter cities and smarter societies.
FIN4 is ambitious. Globally, we face what we could describe as a misalignment
of goals and incentive structures. There are some common goals with respect to
sustainability: the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) [3] and
the Paris Agreement [4]. However, while agreeing on a joint set of supranational
goals is certainly important, it marks only the first step in a long and challenging
transition.
How to translate global goals into individual incentives and collective actions?The
first pillar builds on the concept of nation states, which internalize the global targets
by integrating them into their national legislation. This regulation-based approach
is undoubtedly the most commonly considered when discussing the need for more
sustainability, but it seems to be too slow.
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The second pillar builds on mostly voluntary, often profit-driven contributions
or on self-restraint of global corporations. However, this proves inefficient so far.
By now, it is clear that these pillars alone are insufficient to make our world more
sustainable quickly enough.1
We therefore propose a third pillar, based on “co-opetition”: individual contribu-
tions that are coordinated and assisted digitally, which is the basis of the FIN4 system
and the Climate City Cup.2
In order to develop this concept, accompanied by basic research in the respective
fields, FuturICT 2.0 has proposed to develop a FIN4 demonstrator. This demonstrator
should show that, with modern technology, it is feasible to create an environment
that fosters sustainability without compromising human rights and subsidiarity. Its
goal is to illustrate the possibility of an innovative framework with features such as
the following:
• the ability to create bottom-up money similar to Bitcoin,
• multi-dimensional money exchangewithmultiple currencies representing various
environmental, social and other kinds of values and costs,
• the use of this system to price and trade externalities of different kinds,
• suitable incentive mechanisms enabling a favorable (self-)organization of socio-
economic systems on different scales,
• feedbacks promoting a circular and sharing economy,
• the possibility of taxation.
To achieve these goals, we wanted to combine the following technologies and
principles:
• decentralized currencies andblockchain technology to enable reliable peer-to-peer
contracts, allowing the creation of a direct and sustainable sharing economy,
• sensors and the Internet ofThings (IoT) tomake it possible tomeasure externalities
and build a circular economy, with various externalities represented by different
currencies complementing the current monetary system,
• specific community-based incentives to support the self-organization of complex
systems and help them evolve towards a circular economy; more efficient use of
resources by promoting social cooperation and climate protection,
• research could be conducted in many areas. Among other fields, the team has
explored Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) systems, behavioral economics,
cryptoeconomic design, requirements design, proof mechanisms, identity and
governance (see the Glossary for an explanation of special terms).
1cf. https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/.
2cf. https://climatecitycup.org.
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The Finance 4.0 Framework
One of the reasons for unsustainable behavior is the long period of time between
our actions and the consequences they may have. For instance, people have been
burning coal for two centuries and driving motor vehicles for one century, while
carbon dioxide emissions have only recently been considered to be a serious global
problem. Such circumstances create cognitive dissonance, i.e., an uncomfortable
feeling of inconsistency.
FIN4 aims to create a self-organizing, highly nuanced incentive system that
supports the daily decision-making of people by encouraging desirable actions and
discouraging undesirable behaviors.
To promote sustainability, it is important that the FIN4 system takes externalities
into account. However, the FIN4 system does this by multiple currencies, reflecting
different societal values. By giving externalities prices and allowing them to be
traded, they can be internalized to reflect costs and benefits more accurately in a
multi-dimensional way. Externalities can be positive (like certain kinds of innovation
or infrastructure) or negative (such as pollution).
FIN4 focuses primarily on positive action, rather than on sanctions, for the
following reasons:
As an opt-in system, it would be almost impossible to motivate participants to
join if they would face a negative balance of tokens, taking into account negative
externalities. Obtaining tokens for positive action is a much better value proposition.
FIN4, therefore, focuses on rewards for positive actions, rather than on punishments
for negative actions.
Our daily choices often seem to be detached from our values. Using a smart
distributed incentive system, however, communities can reward what they value—by
issuing new types of tokens to address local needs.
These positive actions can be whatever the community considers to be valuable.
Examples may include planting trees, using a bike rather than a car, helping a person
in need or recycling.
In this case, the tokens can take on any form of value for the communities. They
can be fully symbolic (imagine a virtual trophy representing a tree you have planted),
give access to a service (such as free bicycle maintenance) or even have a monetary
value.
The core process of FIN4 is illustrated in Fig. 2.
A new type of token is created with a name, a short ticker symbol (similar to
“USD” or “BTC”) and a statement describing the purpose of the token. Users can
record actions and then claim the respective tokens. A claim may be verified in three
different ways, which can be combined with each other:
• sensor proofs use data transmitted from an IoT sensor or device for location,
humidity or temperature, for example. This includes mobile proofs from a user’s
smartphone (such as photographic documentation).
• social proofs mean other users attest that a certain action has been performed.
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Fig. 2 Rewarding positive actions is the core of Finance 4.0
• third-party data proofs utilize external sources of data, where this cannot be
generated within the FIN4 system directly (Fig. 3).
Let us here discuss the example of litter disposal.
Alice creates a type of token for incentivizing people to pick up and dispose of
litter they find in public parks. The community collectively likes this idea and adopts
it. While hiking, Bob finds an empty plastic bottle and takes a couple of photos
showing where he found it and where he disposed of it. Bob uploads these pictures
to the claiming platform and other users approve his claim, rewarding him with a
number of positive action tokens.
Sensor or mobile proofs require security measures in the hardware or software to
prevent cheating, such as double claiming. Social proofs need an additional incentive
Fig. 3 Communities create tokens to represent positive actions. Users prove to the system that they
performed such actions to receive the respective tokens
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layer that motivates other users to provide attestations in good faith, while also
preventing collusion.
Placing real-life data on the blockchain is a non-trivial problem and can be suscep-
tible to manipulation or mistakes. In practice, it will likely require combinations of
these proofs (like in our example above) in order to adequately prevent cheating.
After all, data may not necessarily represent the truth of real-world actions. An
oracle based on third-party data might be required to prove that submitted data is
correct, before it is irrevocably placed on an immutable blockchain. Once a claim has
been proven using these approaches—or indeed combinations of them—the tokens
are minted and transferred to the claiming user.
The prover may be the token’s creator, a dedicated group of people (such as token
holders) or any random user, depending on the nature of the action and type of token.
The most effective and useful token systems will likely be approved and adopted by
the community in a self-organized and self-sustaining manner.
We envision a multi-layered, multi-dimensional system of decentralized digital
cryptocurrencies created at different levels with different characteristics, serving
different purposes.
The token systems may operate at a supranational, regional or local level. The
different purposes may address environmental, social or other values relevant for
sustainability or society.
The FIN4 core system comprises a token economy and a governance framework.
The token economygradually emerges as communities asynchronously create, obtain
and trade positive action tokens, thereby creating a market for these positive actions.
In order to align user incentives towards the creation of this market, a governance
layer is needed that supports the development of a healthy token economy. This
governance layer uses a governance token (GOV) to offer mechanisms that allow
users to collectively decide on which tokens to promote as “official FIN4 tokens”
(Fig. 4).
Any system that allows users to propose new token designs will have to deal with
the problem of spam. So, how can we ensure our ecosystem promotes useful token
concepts? Rather than establishing rules and barriers to restrict the creation of tokens,
our design leverages the innovative capacity of independent token proposals. Every
token idea is welcome, but acceptance as an official FIN4 token requires users to
vote for it with their governance (GOV) tokens. Thus, all users co-maintain a list of
approved positive action tokens.
The reputation tokens (REP) to facilitate social proofs do not yet exist in our
system. Their purpose is to help users establish trust in one another in order to interact
effectively on the platform. Reputation should reflect the support of the system by the
user (e.g., proving, voting, etc.) and not their actual positive action token holdings,
which could otherwise introduce bias to the reputation system.
In our current design, users obtain reputation tokens by performing actions that
support and strengthen the entire FIN4 system. As a minimum, the actions suitable
for obtaining these reputation tokens include (1) the active gathering of tokens (low
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Fig. 4 Human coordination in FIN4’s multi-token economy happens on two levels
reward), (2) participation in proof mechanisms (medium reward) and (3) the accep-
tance of token designs by curators (high reward). Finally, users should also be able
to lose these reputation tokens.
Also, how can we incentivize entire communities that may already have their own
tokens established to join the larger ecosystem? The idea is to represent the additional
liquidity won when joining the larger FIN4 network through a “reserve currency”
we call liquidity token (LIQ). This token would stand for the network effects gained
when enabling larger networks and markets.
One conceivable, yet too simplistic approach would be to create the same number
of FIN4 tokens for each accepted token proposal. The overall number of liquidity
tokens would, therefore, be commensurate with the total number of FIN4 tokens in
the system, thereby giving users more trust in using the different tokens and some
assurance that tokens can be exchanged with one another. This could be based on the
original idea of “Bancor” by John Maynard Keynes; however, the final design has
not yet been decided.
Due to the nature of blockchain technology, blockchain creators are unable to
prevent trades beyond the confines of the system. Our approach is to create strong
incentives to use the platform, while preserving the freedom of users to leave at any
time and take their token balances with them.
Furthermore, a form of identity is needed when users wish to participate in the
governance of FIN4. Identity (ID) here corresponds less to the idea of a scanned
passport and more to a concept of self-sovereignty built entirely within the FIN4
system or transferred from other platforms. For example, reputation mechanims may
establish identity over time.
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Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT)
What definitions are currently used in practice for concepts like tokens, transactions
and consensus? And what exactly is distributed ledger technology (DLT)?
The blockchain community still suffers from a general lack of a shared under-
standing of terminology, making comparisons between different blockchain-based
projects difficult. To support a common understanding (and as part of our research
towards the FIN4 system), we developed a systematic taxonomy of distributed ledger
systems [5].
Accordingly, we define distributed ledger technology (DLT) as a range of
distributed data structures in which entries are recorded by participants after reaching
consensus on their validity. A consensus mechanism—the set of rules for transaction
validation—is integrated into a DLT system to ensure system reliability, where no
trusted third parties are required to authorize or validate entries. Distributed ledgers
often support secure token economies. These rely on digital tokens and cryptographic
techniques to determine how to perform exchange between participants. The most
well-known and successful example of a DLT system is Bitcoin.
While the taxonomy paper mentioned above provides a more extensive introduc-
tion to the topic, a conceptual architecture of distributed ledger technology is shown
in the figure below.
Incentivization may occur on either the consensus or action layer. The first gener-
ation of blockchains are known as cryptocurrencies. They are chiefly based on
incentive systems that maintain consensus mechanisms in the digital world.
The second generation of blockchain projects are based on smart contract
engines allowing for the creation of tokens. These tokens can be utilized to incen-
tivize people or machines to perform certain actions in the real world. One example
for a token standard that creates fungible (exchangeable) tokens is the widely used
ERC20 token standard on the Ethereum smart contract platform3—also used as a
basis for our positive action tokens in the FIN4 system.
FIN4 takes full advantage of this possibility by not only creating a range of
platform tokens used for governance, but also by offering users mechanisms to create
tokens as they wish (Fig. 5).
The taxonomy paper categorizes different examples of existing tokens by means
of several attributes [5]. These attributes include the underlying source of value of the
token, the regulation of action/read permissions, the supply policy, the transferability
and the condition governing the minting of new tokens. It also covers the various
consensus mechanisms that exist, such as “proof of work” or “proof of stake.”
TheFIN4 systemwill foster communities that can create anduse tokens to promote
the sustainable action they consider important, following a consensus framework we
like to call “proof of good work.”
Many aspects of cryptoeconomic design will be available to these communities
when creating token proposals. Community members will be able to configure a
3cf. www.ethereum.org.
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Fig. 5 Conceptual architecture of distributed ledger systems, based on [5]
range of token attributes. For example, what is the claiming process? Who is able to
approve claims? And how many tokens should be minted for every verified positive
action?
Value-Sensitive Design
The world faces major challenges as a consequence of insufficient sustainability. We
assume that current economic incentives, which fail to effectively reward sustainable
behavior, are partly responsible for this problem.
Sustainability
One of the key objectives of the FIN4 platform is to address sustainability issues and
reduce negative environmental externalities with positive action. We hope to achieve
this by creating a system that enables communities to define sustainable and socially
desirable actions and to reward individuals who align their behavior with these goals,
using exchangeable incentive tokens. Note, however, that not everyone needs to
engage in the same kinds of actions to be rewarded. On the contrary: the system
supports specific actions fitting personal preferences and talents. In this regard, the
multi-dimensionality of the approach is highly relevant.
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Inclusion
In order to achieve this transformation towards a world, which is more aware of
sustainability, the FIN4 system follows a bottom-up approach that enables everyone
to participate, contribute their own ideas and protect the system for the benefit of the
community.
Communities should not only be able to determine the values and token concepts
most important to them, but also to shape how the platform develops. The users
themselves will also be essential for maintaining the system and for protecting it
from abuse via the reputation tokens. These tokens will enable every user to have a
say on which token proposals to accept. However, the weight that their votes carry
will depend on how trustworthy their conduct has been so far.
Freedom
We believe that people should be encouraged, not compelled, to participate, which
speaks for an opt-in platform. Users would be able to interact with the FIN4 platform
as long as they wish—and also leave, whenever they want, perhaps even with the
possibility to take their token holdings with them.
The decentral nature of permissionless DLT—for both data storage and decision-
making—is intended to prevent a single point of failure or authority. This provides
protection against censorship, inappropriate control, or other arbitrary interventions,
since data is stored immutably on the blockchain.
User identities are pseudonymous, thereby protecting the privacy of individuals.
Anonymity is an essential requirement of democratic systemswith privacyprotection.
It allows participants to engage in independent decision-making.
The pursuit of multiple objectives can, however, result in conflicting goals, which
we have realized in a dedicated ethics workshop with ethix.4 We attempt to minimize
such conflicts using appropriate coordination mechanisms and, where they are too
limited, suitable governance. We outline these ethical considerations below.
Preventing Misuse
We do not dictate what behavior we consider socially desirable. Instead, we leave
this decision to the community. So, how to prevent misuse of the platform? If users
acted in bad faith or for their own purely selfish interests, they may indeed start to
reward actions with tokens that do not accord with the moral principles of the project.
Such misuse would not only harm the FIN4 community, it might also have wider
consequences for society.
4cf. www.ethix.ch.
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Nonetheless, we trust that a critical mass of users can prevent such misuse, as they
have the power to vote down tokenproposals created in bad faith. Trustworthy users—
i.e., those with more reputation tokens—will have a greater voice in determining the
list of official tokens. This mechanism can also avoid excessive spam in the system.
Ensuring Democratic Legitimacy
The inclusive and voluntary nature of the platform means that the issuance of tokens
will be legitimized by a high level of participation, with decision-making being
subject to voting.
However, there is a risk that a consistent majority will end up holding a position
of power, such that individuals with minority positions may be discriminated against
to some degree. This could be exacerbated—to some extent—by reputation tokens,
as they would allow trusted groups to accumulate voting power.
In order to prevent a scenario in which a majority suppresses minorities from
happening, a maximum number of reputation tokens should be defined—with no
user being able to hold more than this limit. This would help to contain the risk
that a certain group accumulates too much power (see also the subsection below on
“Governance”).
Avoiding Social Pressure
While we hope that FIN4 proves useful in promoting a sustainable society and that
the platform enjoys widespread adoption, we realize that mass adoption could result
in growing social pressure on non-users to join the platform. This would question
the voluntary nature of the platform.
Those who choose not to participate may face exclusion from certain kinds of
transactions—a situation that might put the core value of freedom at risk and would
have to be counteracted.
Governance
There are also important ethical considerations in terms of platform governance.
Once the platform is launched, the integrated governancemechanismswill largely
determine the success of FIN4—especially as we will then cede the content and
structure to the community, losing our ability to make subsequent changes.
Anticipating these potential risks ahead of time is key. Therefore, our approach
to governance includes the following:
• Blockchain: This technology permits decentralized decision-making as well as
transparent data storage. The security risk is distributed across the network and,
thereby, minimized. Furthermore, pseudonymous participation as implied by a
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public blockchain is compatible with the core values of inclusion, privacy and
freedom.
• Openness: The platform is open to anyone who wishes to participate. This is
intended to legitimize the new decision-making processes.
• Community moderation: A hierarchy will emerge between users with different
balances of reputation tokens, which are given to those userswho commit time and
effort to the platform. These tokens will help protect the platform from malicious
actors. The combination of inclusion and a time- and effort-based hierarchy may
produce both meritocratic and democratic effects. What is more, the use of proce-
dures like “quadratic voting” would reduce the risk of certain users accumulating
too much voting power.
The Cryptoeconomic Design of Finance 4.0
Relevance of Cryptoeconomic Design
As mentioned earlier in the DLT taxonomy section, there is a lack of commonly
agreed terms in this field. This is also true for the term “cryptoeconomics.” Vitalik
Buterin—the founder of Ethereum—posited that cryptoeconomics is a discipline that
combines cryptographic proofs of past events with economic incentives to encourage
future events as part of a blockchain system [6].
The cryptographic components mainly encompass consensus algorithms, enabled
by digital signatures and hash functions, and havemore recently progressed to include
zero-knowledge proofs, multi-party computation and homomorphic encryption [7].
The economic components involve principles of game theory, mechanism design and
network economics. As explaining all these terms is out of scope of this book, we
recommend interested readers to consult the references to get a better understanding
of them. In a nutshell, the aimof applied cryptoeconomics is to design new economies
based on cryptographic tokens and mechanisms in order to create incentive systems
for users.
Web 2.0 applications (known as Apps) refer to platforms like Facebook, Google
or Amazon. These are to be contrasted with the emerging Web 3.0—and Decentral-
ized Applications (known as DApps)—which are relevant to FIN4. Decentralized
Applications run on peer-to-peer networks, where no node typically enjoys privi-
leges over other nodes. This is quite unlike Web 2.0 Apps controlled by a central
provider. While both cases require functional and error-free code, this is not enough
for the Web 3.0. That is because DApps encode economic incentives using smart
contracts in order to incentivize certain actions. In the example of Bitcoin, miners
are rewarded with newly mined Bitcoins for successfully mining a new block. These
mechanisms are cryptographically protected and practically impossible to change.
As a consequence, modifications to the software require the coordinated effort of all
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nodes. If only a majority of nodes cooperate, rather than all, the network runs the
risk of diverging in a “fork.”
Even if the code of DApps is flawless, the decentralized system may still fail due
to themechanisms built into the network, if they are based on inaccurate assumptions
about individual or collective user behavior. This is particularly true if the system
neglects to consider potential misuse, malicious action, or user mistakes. Effective
crypoteconomic design (CED), therefore, needs to take all this into account (Fig. 6).
Effective CED is important for several reasons. First of all, implementing the
values of a developer community into individual incentives for a larger user base is
rather difficult. Good cryptoeconomic design seeks to reduce the potential for incen-
tive misalignment at the various levels of the system as illustrated in the following
figure based on Zargham [8]. The framework is useful for analyzing CED systems
by highlighting the interconnections: five distinct layers, with each layer requiring
the layer beneath and enabling the layer above.
Second, effective CED is vital since the possibilities to implement subsequent
changes or corrections to a live DApp are very limited. Smart contracts written on a
blockchain can neither be stopped nor modified easily.
Third, CED needs to take into account the challenge of designing a complex
system. Here, multiple variables and interrelationships come into play, which allow
for suitable self-organization and emergence of behavioral patterns.
Fig. 6 Creating
interconnected collaborative
communities (based on [8])
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Fourth, cryptoeconomic design must reflect the implicit objective of cryptoeco-
nomic systems to translate the values of a community into specific incentives for
individuals. For instance, the Bitcoin community values secure and non-censorable
transactions above everything else. The system, therefore, promotes decentralized
mining to run the transactions. On the other hand, minimizing energy consumption
was not considered an important value in the Bitcoin community and no incen-
tive—other than waste minimization/profit maximization for miners—was therefore
established to pursue it. The heated debate whether Bitcoin wastes energy or pushes
the price of renewables close to zero over time, resulting in a net positive effect, is
still ongoing.
Designing Cryptoeconomic Systems
The problems addressed by cryptoeconomic systems are invariably complex, and,
as it is a new field, standard processes for cryptoeconomic design have not yet
been established. However, a multi-scale perspective can be adopted to compre-
hend complex economic and cryptoeconomic systems. Policymakers can seek to
change the global system behavior either via enforced rules (which we find problem-
atic) or incentives (which we find more agreeable). These policies affect the local
behavior of agents and, in turn, influence global behavior. Nevertheless, designing a
cryptoeconomic system that works as intended is a complex problem requiring the
configuration of various system attributes such as the permissions in a system, the
supply of a token and the type of distributed ledger utilized.
In order to simplify this configuration process, the following three-step method-
ology can be utilized:
First, the system designer has to map the goals of a cryptoeconomic system
to specific requirements of that system. Second, based on these requirements, the
designer can utilize Fig. 11 from Dobler et al. [9] to identify the right system layout.
Third, once a layout is chosen, the DLT taxonomy mentioned earlier [5] can be used
to configure the system layout with the appropriate attributes (Fig. 7).
The Finance 4.0 Token Economy
The FIN4 system is designed to store a variety of information. This includes which
tokens have been created, who has claimed which tokens, who has submitted proofs
for actions, and who owns which tokens. This balance and tracking information is
required for positive action tokens as well as meta tokens for FIN4 governance.
As an open, community-based system, FIN4 allows multiple roles for writing
information to the blockchain. Depending on the proof mechanism, for example, any
user can approve action proofs by other users. Moreover, users are able to create and
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Fig. 7 Impact of system requirements on system layout (based on [5])
obtain positive action tokens anonymously; this helps to make the platform openly
accessible.
We have also decentralized the necessary mechanisms to the greatest extent
possible, to avoid the need for an “always-online trusted third party.”
According to the decision tree proposed by Wüst and Gervais [10], a permission-
less blockchain is recommended for such a setup (Fig. 8). FIN4 is built using smart
contracts secured by the Ethereum network (a permissionless blockchain system).
Fig. 8 Decision process for permission types in a Blockchain-based system (based on [10])
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Thus, mapping our system goals and values (see the section on “Value-Sensitive
Design”) according to the design requirements proposed by Dobler et al. [9], the
FIN4 system requirements can be summarized as follows:
• Transparency:FIN4aims to increase the visibility of certain undervalued actions.
Many positive things that people do every day go unnoticed as the current mone-
tary system does not ascribe value to this behavior. Visibility is also required in
order for markets to emerge for the various positive action tokens, with much of
this data stored and tracked on the blockchain.
• Automation: FIN4 aims to ensure that all users are treated as equal peers in the
system, the rules for creating and obtaining tokens as well as governance need to
be codified in a neutral way, with smart contracts.
• Incentivization: FIN4 aims to create a multi-dimensional incentive system to
encourage more sustainable behavior, rewarding good actions with incentives in
the form of various cryptoeconomic tokens.
With these requirements, the FIN4 system layout has to consist of a distributed ledger,
smart contracts and cryptoeconomic tokens.
Applying Zargham’s layered model (see Fig. 9 and cf. Fig. 6), FIN4 is based on
an enabling economy, consisting of a distributed ledger (DL[T]) and smart contracts
(SC), ensuring durable data and trusted computation, in a permissionless envi-
ronment. Above this layer, a set of constraints in the form of local mechanisms
Fig. 9 Interconnected layers
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(for actions, proofs and token curation) as well as incentives (to create and obtain
tokens and the associated actions) are defined. The different tokens—[official] Posi-
tive Action Tokens ([O]PAT), Reputation Tokens (REP), and Governance Tokens
(GOV)—allow for complex interaction patterns. Exposing such interactions to the
real-world, as defined by the community’s needs, should lead to local agent behavior
that is conducive to the global goals for the FIN4 system.
FIN4 ultimately aims to enable a new type of economy that better values sustain-
able action—from the perspective of communities themselves to society at large.
This value should not be created in isolation, but result in a flow of values within the
network to balance the demand and supply of positive actions, leading to the optimal
allocation of resources to achieve global goals of sustainable behavior at scale.
Simulating the Token Design Space
Agent-based modeling (ABM) has been used extensively in the past few years [11–
13] as a powerful tool, also in the context of econophysics [14], and especially for
market modeling [15, 16]. Moreover, ABM-based computer simulations proved to
be useful in the study of socio-economic systems and more [17–19].
Generally, the agents in ABM simulations are given attributes to define their
behavior. They can adapt according to situations and interact with each other [20].
In our agent-based approach, we have human agents which fulfill certain roles (like
token claimers or token creators) and token-type agents. The FIN4 simulation code
is open source and is based on time steps, using cadCAD,5 an open-source tool
for “complex adaptive dynamics computer-aided design”. At every time step, key
variables are updated through actions or policies.
In addition to being sustainable and scalable, the FIN4 system should also be
resilient to unintended user behavior. We use simulations to improve the cryptoeco-
nomic design towards system stability and to avoid dynamics that may result from
not fully accounting for the “human factor.”
Our definition of an ideal stable system includes token creators with noble intent,
tokens invulnerable to manipulation and users using tokens as intended. In contrast,
bad situations can occur due to token creatorswithmalicious intent, tokens vulnerable
to manipulation, or users cheating.
The simulation configuration allows one to study groups of human users as agents
with certain predefined attributes (e.g., intentions, compliance with rules or commit-
ments defining a type of token) or with random attributes. To bootstrap a token-based
economy in a community, agents can define types of tokens that will be available
for claiming or allowing fellow agents to create their own tokens with a certain
frequency.
5cf. www.cadCAD.org.
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Fig. 10 Elements of an iterative simulation concept for the Finance 4.0 system with tokens
representing positive action (PAT), reputation (REP), or governance (GOV)
Figure 10 illustrates the iterative approach that the simulation concept is built on.
The simulation follows the natural stages that users encounter when joining the Fin4
system and accounts for the risks that occur at each stage.
The basic principle of FIN4 is that anyone can access the system (stage 0).
Depending on their intentions, users may enter individually or as a “cartel” in a
coordinated fashion to unduly influence the system. The main safeguard against this
is to use blockchain technology: Wallets and keys represent barriers and prevent
users from spamming (e.g., auto-registering many fake users).
Once they entered the system (stage 1), users can obtain Positive Action Tokens
(PATs) at their own discretion. The core problem here is cheating: Users try to obtain
tokens without performing the required actions. Therefore, an extendable set of proof
mechanisms is put in place to support the process of proving actions. As anyone is
able to create new types of Positive Action Tokens (PATs, stage 2), the system may
face a flood of PATs. To navigate the token space and avoid malicious tokens to gain
traction, users co-curate tokens and promote the trustworthy ones. As anyone is able
to participate in token curation (stage 3), more complex types of malicious behavior
are thinkable. To counter them, a reputation mechanism is put in place to steer how
users gain power for co-governance over time.
For the evaluation of the system’s state, we identified a series of behavioral
and design parameters and visualized them as dimensions of a three-dimensional
parameter space (see Fig. 11).
Obtainer compliance: “1” means that token obtainers respect and fulfill the token
proof type according to the demands of the token creator. “−1” means that all the
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Fig. 11 Token design space of the Finance 4.0 system
users find a way to claim the token without doing the action for it, by finding the
weak spot of the token proof mechanism and exploiting it.
Token robustness: “1” means that the design of the token proof is so good that it
has no weak spots that can be exploited, yet it is simple enough not to hinder users
in claiming. “−1” means that the token proof mechanism is flawed and individuals
can claim tokens without performing the action the token was created for.
Creator intent: “1”means that the token creator has noble intent when creating the
token, e.g., for slowing down climate change, feeding the poor, saving endangered
species, etc. “−1” means that the token creator is malicious (usually focused on
personal gain), intending, for example, the exploitation of users, the manipulation of
public opinion or the destruction of private property.
The “Ideal” region of the parameter space represents the best case in which the
users are compliant, the token types have robust proof mechanisms and the intention
of the token creator is noble. The “Compliant Community” area is equivalent to the
“Ideal” case only when all users are compliant. The “Danger Zones” correspond to
worst-case scenarios. They are characterized by the malicious intent of the token
creator that can be hidden from the token claimers. On the other hand, the “Road to
Hell” area contains tokens created with good intentions that are abused or misused by
the community. The “No Takeoff” regions and the “Swamp Area” lack compliance
of the users.
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At this stage of the simulations, the token types created are mapped to the param-
eter space according to their attributes (robust or weak design) and the community
profile (compliance and intention). So far, the picture is a static one. The next steps
are to introduce reputation (and governance) tokens and the Token Curated Registry
(TCR). Once human agents will vote for token types according to their interests
(using GOV tokens) and will challenge official tokens for the sake of the community
(using the TCR), the static picture will become dynamic and PAT types will move
from one area in the parameter space to another. Our goal is to study these dynamics
and to figure out how we can keep tokens out of the “Danger Zones” and create
traction towards the top right corner (“Ideal”) (Fig. 11).
In our point of view, the governance of a decentralized system should be based on
trust and experience. In order to select the peoplewhowill obtain the power to vote on
official tokens, we propose constructing a trust network in the community using repu-
tation tokens (REP). Once the network is vast enough (measured in terms of nodes
and links between nodes), we focus on key nodes in the newly formed network: the
nodesmost connected directly to other nodes (Total DegreeCentrality), the interfaces
between groups (Betweenness Centrality) and the most influential/powerful actors
according to the network (Eigenvector Centrality).
The Finance 4.0 Technology Landscape
The Finance 4.0 Architecture
In order to contribute to solving real-world sustainability issues, our ambition was
also to lay the groundwork of a system that can survive and thrive under real-world
conditions, applying system engineering methods.
As a first step towards developing a demonstrator platform, a series of workshops
was conducted, aiming at compiling an initial list of requirements.
Two expert workshops were organized in 2018 to examine a range of specific
challenges. A proving workshop in Zurich covered topics relating to the design and
use of oracles, while a cryptoeconomics workshop in Berlin discussed some of the
decisions made for the incentive system.
Based on the results of the requirements phase and the workshops, a functional
architecture was developed to describe the core functionality of FIN4 (see Fig. 12).
The system architecture consists of three main layers (bottom to top):
• Ablockchain layer:The blockchain including the smart contract engine serves as
backbone tomake FIN4 a decentralized, peer-to-peer platform. Transactions, data
on smart contracts and balances on tokens are stored immutable and tamper-proof
on the blockchain ledger.
• A smart contract layer: FIN4 smart contracts get deployed onto the blockchain.
They comprise both the operation logic and the storage of most of the data. All of
the functionality lies here and is accessible even fromoutside theFIN4 application.
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Fig. 12 Functional architecture of the Finance 4.0 system
While most data is stored directly on the contracts, media files provided to proof
claims (e.g., a picture of a planted tree) are uploaded to the Inter-Planetary File
System (IPFS), and only their identifiers are stored on the smart contract. The
claims pool is not yet implemented.
• An application layer: The purpose of the application layer is to interface with
end users—typically via Web or mobile applications. While a default client for
both Web and mobile is provided, third parties can also interface with the system
by building their own clients. Thus, they can limit the functionality that the FIN4
smart contracts provide. Extensions to the FIN4 core system, however, can only
be made on the smart contract layer.
Suitable programming languages and frameworks have to be defined to implement
this functional architecture. For the smart contract engine and blockchain layer, we
chose the Ethereum platform.6 Ethereum is a relatively widespread and established
smart contract engine, with a large community of developers and projects, as well as
a broad range of development tools.
The FIN4Xplorer is running on the Rinkeby test net.7 There are currently no plans
tomake the demonstrator available onEthereum’smain net, as high costswould incur
and there would be no immediate gains in functionality or performance. However,
projects that follow on from FuturICT 2.0 in the future may choose to take this route.
The FIN4 smart contracts are written in the Solidity programming language8 and
deployed using Truffle9 as a framework and Infura10 as a provider.
The FIN4 client we provide is a Web application written in JavaScript11 using the
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browsers, which are Web 3.0-enabled. All is currently hosted on Amazon Web
Services.13
Earlier setups with Internet of Things devices as proof type used a Node server14
to receive the signals from the sensors and forward them to a smart contract, acting
as an oracle. The respective code from the github repositories FIN4OracleEngine
and FIN4Sensor can be modified to connect other IoT devices.
The Finance 4.0 Development Phases
The FIN4 demonstrator software, called FIN4Xplorer, progressed through several
development phases before reaching its current state.
Phase 1: The “Slick but Centralized” (SLIC) Release
Our initial version (developed by Quasi Jouda) performed all blockchain interactions
via a server. This architecture offered the convenient, demo-friendly advantage that
users could sign up easily (with just a nickname) and participate in creating and
claiming tokens within moments of accessing the Web application.
The drawback, however, was that it did not live up to the standards of a distributed
project. The use of a centralized server and the custody of users’ private keys create
vulnerabilities to attacks, while also teaching new users a flawed concept.
We had the responsibility to get it right, since many of our users’ first contact with
blockchain technology would be through our DApp. Setting up and using a crypto
wallet that the users can control was, therefore, important.
Phase 2: The “Fabulous Five” (FAB5) Release
A team of five volunteers (Simon Zachau, Benjamin Degenhart, Kriti Shreshtha,
Sangeeta Joseph and LeonKobinger) completely re-implemented the system to come
up with a fully decentralized solution. Their task was to focus on the mechanisms
required to link a positive action in the real world to a token balance—i.e., the steps
for making claims that are proven in several different ways.
Phase 3: The “Explorer” (XPLR) Release
One member of the “Fabulous Five” (Benjamin Degenhart) continued to work on
the system. This phase saw the introduction of more new features including the
13cf. https://aws.amazon.com/.
14cf. https://nodejs.org/.
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ability to create user groups, token collections, messages and an own Ether faucet
(so users could easily request Ether) andQR codes, as well as transfer token balances.
Furthermore, the following four major contributions were integrated.
The first contribution (by Gabriel Hirschbaeck) was a generic smart contract from
which different base versions of positive action tokens can be derived in accordance
with the taxonomy [21]. Supporting these base versions was a key step towards
enabling the breadth of token economies we envision.
The second contribution (by Sergiu Soima) came in the form of the Token Curated
Registry (TCR) [22]. A TCR allows an anonymous group of economically incen-
tivized users to maintain a list of entries by submitting votes or challenges. We use
this mechanism in our governance layer for maintaining a list of Official Position
Action Tokens.
The third contribution (by Piotr Chodyko, Moritz Schindelmann, John Rachwan,
and Ling Zhu) redesigned the provingmechanism and created a systematic taxonomy
to classify verifiers and implemented an integrated verification system with multiple
types of verifiers and decentralized proof of storage [23].
The fourth contribution (by Kriti Shreshtha) was new functionality that allows to
incentivize entire communities/collectives rather than just individual users [24].
The Finance 4.0 Demonstrator
As a typical Web3.0 application, FIN4Xplorer15 consists of two parts: (1) smart
contracts on the Ethereum blockchain required for all functionality that should
be run in a decentralized, immutable manner and (2) a front end or Decentral-
ized App (DApp) client that serves as a Web interface to the smart contracts. The
Ethereum blockchain was chosen as it meets the requirements as an open-source,
public blockchain that supports smart contracts. Since it is widely used, one can
find much documentation and online resources as well as tap into a large and active
developer community.
A user can simply connect to the live version of our demonstrator by visiting
https://demo.finfour.net.
From a user perspective, the key difference between a Web 3.0 DApp and a Web
2.0 service is the need for a bridge to the blockchain: a crypto wallet. The first task
of a crypto wallet is to connect to the blockchain network, either via a full node
run by users themselves or via a gateway service like Infura.16 Its second task is to
appear whenever the user wishes to write data to the blockchain. The recommended
crypto wallet to connect to the FIN4 system is MetaMask,17 which is available both
as a browser extension for the desktop (Chrome, Firefox, Opera and Brave) and as a
mobile App (iOS and Android). With a crypto wallet, the user can follow the steps to
15Source code available at https://github.com/FuturICT2/.
16cf. https://infura.io/.
17cf. https://metamask.io/.
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create a new account—or restore an existing account. To connect to FIN4, the user
needs to switch from the Main Ethereum Network to the Rinkeby Test Network.18
The last step before starting is to acquire free Rinkeby Ether tokens by using either
• the authenticated faucet at faucet.rinkeby.io (in exchange for a public social media
post you receive some Ether tokens);
• the FIN4 faucet server available for users on the demo.finfour.net landing page.
For this, click the button [Request Ether] and wait for confirmation.
If FIN4 is migrated to the Ethereum main network in the future, real Ether tokens
(ETH)will be required for writing transactions to the blockchain. Such tokens cannot
be received from faucets for free; they have to be earned through mining or bought
at exchanges with cryptocurrency or fiat money.
Information Box: Web 3.0 Technologies Used in Finance 4.0
The smart contracts are written in Solidity19 and deployed on the Rinkeby
testnet20 via Truffle.21 Rinkeby is suitable for the development stage as it uses
freely available tokens—unlike the Ethereum main net which requires tokens
obtained through exchange or mining. We simulate the Ethereum blockchain
using Ganache from Truffle.22 To store media files required by certain proof
types, we use IPFS23 via the Infura gateway.24 The MetaMask crypto wallet25
allows users to connect desktop or mobile browsers to the Ethereum network.
The frontend is a React app26 that uses Drizzle from Truffle27 to connect to the
smart contracts on Ethereum.
Learn more about the Web3.0 development tool chain at https://fin4xplorer.
readthedocs.io.
After successfully connecting to the FIN4 DApp, the user should see the Home
screen (Fig. 13). From there, you can access the Tokens and Claims tab from the
navigation bar at the bottom. The three icons in the top right enable users to display
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Fig. 13 Main screen of the Finance 4.0 DApp (available at https://demo.finfour.net.)
The Tokens tab allows users to create new tokens, as well as view further informa-
tion about how they work and how to claim them. Viewing a token opens a dedicated
page showing details about the design and performance of the token.
The token creator takes the user step by step through the process of creating a
new ERC-2028 token, or “Positive Action Token.” Alongside some basic information
like a name, a 3 to 5 character long symbol and a description as well as various
fundamental properties of the token design have to be specified, which define the
economy that can revolve around this token later on. Furthermore, verifiers are added
here that define the proofs user have to provide in order to successfully claim this
token. None of the choices a token creator makes in this process can be undone—that
is why it is important to think carefully about how to design the new token.
The Claims tab follows the same layout as the Tokens tab. Here, you can submit
new claims and view a list of previous claims. “Claiming” is the process of saying
28cf. https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-20.
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that you did a positive action in the real world and want the respective token for it. If
the claim can be automatically verified, the transfer of the respective token happens
immediately, otherwise only upon successful delivery of the necessary (manual)
proofs that are required from the claiming user.
For governance, the FIN4 system currently offers a Token Curated Registry
(TCR) that allows to collectively manage Positive Action Tokens (PAT). When they
collected enough reputation (REP), users can claim governance tokens (GOV) for
their reputation tokens (REP). Using the same mechanism, users can collectively
change the rules of the token registry by voting on parameter changes. Users with
enough governance tokens (GOV) can curate the list of Official Positive Action
Tokens (OPATs) in the token curated registry.
Other features for communities are token collections and user groups. Token
collections are an easy way to access a predefined list of existing tokens. The feature
“user groups” allows one to define user groups for managing token collections and
for determining participants in social verification mechanisms.
Finally, a basic messaging system allows users to send messages to each other
pseudonymously.
The Finance 4.0 Governance System
FIN4 aims to create an open-source, distributed platform for communities willing
to incentivize sustainable actions. Sustainability, privacy and individual freedom are
key to the platform. FIN4, therefore, incorporates different types of identity and
distributed governance on multiple levels.
But howdoparticipants identify themselves?Towhat extent can reputation replace
identity? How can we prevent malicious use and inadequate accumulation of power?
And how can we assure participation in governance and meaningful debates?
These questions are far from trivial and can be approached from different perspec-
tives. Certainly, further research is needed before large-scale deployment of the FIN4
system is advised.
Blockchain Governance and Practical Implications
Code—and any implementation of blockchain-based governance—is always
embedded in a social context. Every distributed ledger technology (DLT) project is
nestled in a political reality, with laws and decision-making procedures, and cannot
be seen as fully independent. Whenever we talk about on-(block)chain governance
within FIN4, we see the decisions taken as part of a greater social system. And these
actions and decisions are bound to the same rules, laws and regulations as other
projects.
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Fig. 14 Potential governance framework for FIN4
Nevertheless, blockchain-based systems allow one to support a power shift from
centralized top-down governed structures to federated, self-organizing, bottom-up
communities, which do not simply try to cement the status quo.
In the case of FIN4, our goal is to implement a direct democratic voting system
linked to the reputation system which is inherent to the platform. Reputation tokens
lead to voting rights that can be exercised in all kinds of decisions at different levels—
from token curated registries to substantial decisions about the future direction of
FIN4.
A number of issues need attention when translating reputation tokens into voting
tokens. First, we want reputation to influence voting power. Users with a longer
history of honest interactions in the system should enjoy more power. But how
much more? To prevent an unbalanced distribution of power and a dictatorship of a
group of people, we propose two mechanisms: quadratic voting and a hard cap on
reputation tokens. What is more, voting tokens used for voting on system parameters
and functions are not returned to users, but instead “burned.” This means users would
have to carefully consider when to spend voting tokens, since using themmeans they
are gone.
For decisions with a smaller scope, such as voting on which tokens to include in
the Token Curated Registry (TCR), one could introduce another type of token—TCR
tokens. These could have different qualities compared to the voting tokens above.
For example, theymay be uncapped and returned to users winning a vote. They could
also be transferable.
Voting pools could represent different communities and would help to ensure
that the users are not overwhelmed with too many voting options (Fig. 14).
Governance Layer
The governance layer is required to align user incentives towards the creation and
maintenance of token economies. It offers mechanisms that allow users to collec-
tively decide on which tokens to include as official FIN4 tokens and which ones to
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Fig. 15 Staking and voting as basic mechanisms of a Token Curated Registry (based on [25])
reject (first order governance in Fig. 14). On a higher level, the system offers on-
chain governance—the possibility for users to collectively change the governance
rules (second order governance in Fig. 14).
Any system that permits users to submit new token proposals will sooner or later
face the problem of how to deal with spam or malicious tokens. Rather than erecting
rules or barriers to restrict token creation, our design utilizes the innovative capacity
of independent token proposals. Every token idea is welcome, but adoption as an
official FIN4 token requires a sufficiently large share of users to approve the proposal.
Based on democratic decision procedures, approvals may also be withdrawn. In any
case, the users would collaborate to co-maintain a list of official FIN4 tokens in a
Token Curated Registry (TCR) (Fig. 15).
Reputation
The purpose of the reputation tokens (REP) is to help pseudonymous users trust each
other in order to interact effectively on the platform. Reputation reflects the positive,
platform-sustaining actions performed by a user. These actions can include the active
gathering of positive action tokens (zero or low REP reward), participating in proof
mechanisms or certain governance mechanisms (medium reward) and successfully
proposing official tokens (high reward). In addition, developers should be able to get
reputation rewards for contributing to the technical development of the platform.
It should also be possible for users to lose reputation tokens, especially if they
interact with the system in a fraudulent way, e.g., by giving false testimony in a
social-proof mechanism. However, these mechanisms are still under development.
Tokens based on reputation—as the “qualifiedmoney” idea suggests—sometimes
raise concerns. However, it is important to realize that money is already judged in
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this way when we shop online. Factors such as location, type of computer, and
other personal qualifiers are used to discriminate among different kinds of online
consumers and offer them different prices. Therefore, reputation systems already
interfere with our current economic system. FIN4 utilizes reputation not as a mech-
anism to discriminate against users, but to discourage bad actors and thereby secure
a healthy platform. What is more: its opt-in nature and democratic voting give it
legitimacy.
Identity
Our idea is to keep the system open, so users can connect different digital identities
they have from other providers. Within the FIN4 system, a username linked to an
Ethereum address and a reputation score would be already sufficient to establish an
identity (ID). But if FIN4 should also allow you to receive tokens tied to a specific
citizenship or residency (such as local recycling tokens that may be turned into free
museum admission), one could imagine using other forms of IDs to validate claims
to certain tokens. It may be beneficial if the system were compatible with both,
completely self-sovereign and government-validated digital identity systems.
The ultimate goal of FIN4 is to develop a system design that maximizes privacy
(through participation based on self-sovereign digital IDs) and that ensures equality
(through caps and quadratic voting), honesty (through reputation) and participation
(through easy accessibility).
Proof Mechanisms
Our goal is to create an open-source, distributed platform that allows communities
to incentivize sustainable actions using positive action tokens. Users can browse the
available FIN4 tokens and see which actions can be carried out in order to earn the
respective tokens. After performing the relevant action (planting a tree, collecting
litter, or similar), the users need to submit a proof that they actually completed the
required action.
But how to prove actions? How can one incentivize users to report actions truth-
fully? And how can one ensure reliable data is delivered by sensors? This is where
proof mechanisms come in.
Token creators on the FIN4 platform will be able to choose from a range of
default proof mechanisms for their incentivized actions. These proof mechanisms
could include social proofs—requiring other platform users to verify user claims—
as well as sensor proofs and oracles based on third-party data. Combinations are also
possible.
Whenever we need to prove something—in everyday life or within the FIN4
system—there is a trade-off between certainty and usability. With FIN4, proving
actions represents a particular challenge. A good balance needs to be found between
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the effort required and the certainty of proving activities. These proof mechanisms
also need to be carefully adapted to each individual token type. For example, a token
for promoting a reduction in noise level will use different proofs (including sensors)
compared to a token for community cleanup events (removing litter from a public
park, for example).
One proof type is the sensor proof , which is based on a direct measurement of
sustainability data. It requires the least human input and can potentially democratize
the provision of and access to data, thereby promoting the value of decentralization
while also maximizing efficiency in the proof process. Ideally, data fed into FIN4
should come from these direct measurement sources. Social proofs would only come
into play whenever objective measurements are unavailable. Third-party data could
be used where data cannot be generated directly within the FIN4 system.
Combinations of proofs will be required to make it more difficult to game the
system. Redundancy can be used to increase the reliability of proofs. This is also
true in the case of sensors, where a single measurement device may display errors.
With social proofs, we generally rely on a testimonial provided by an individual
or a sample of typically unrelated people. While users may be able to testify for
themselves (auto proof), using a password, signature or similar, we mainly want to
work with testimonials provided by peer users. The more users testify to a claim, the
more reliable the social proof usually becomes. However, one needs to consider the
costs of multiple verifications, which reduce the efficiency of the system. Therefore,
social proofs should be straightforward, so random users can do the verification.
Both individual and social proofs can be based on location certain roles or skills,
but do not have to. Testimonial power can also be linked to user reputation. But what
happens if two validators do not agree? A third validator with a high reputation could
be involved to act as a tie breaker. The third validator aswell as the one they agreewith
would receive the regular reputation tokens. Conversely, the user who had submitted
false evidence would lose reputation tokens. However, the defeated validator may
appeal the decision, putting more reputation tokens at stake. An additional validator
would then be called upon to be the judge, with the process continuing in this way if
further appeals are submitted.
Honey pots involving fake proof tasks could also be used to catch bad actors and
decrease their reputation tokens. These mechanisms may help maintain the integrity
of the FIN4 system, while also striking a balance between usability and reliability
(see Fig. 16).
Research Outlook: Long-Termism
The first studies and software developments connected with the FIN4 project were
initiated by FuturICT 2.0—a FLAG-ERA project supported by the Swiss National
Foundation (SNF). FuturICT 2.0 created related concepts, released an initial software
demonstrator and spread the idea in academia and beyond (cf. Fig. 17).
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Fig. 16 Type of measurement decides the type of proof mechanisms
FIN4Plus and FIN4Xplorer were two follow-up projects that were supported
by EIT Climate-KIC. They initiated a co-design process where the ideas and
concepts entered the EIT Climate-KIC strategy for running demonstrations. In that
phase, the initial demonstrator software was completely overhauled, improved and
extended, thereby incorporating all the different modules into a single, coherent and
decentralized demonstrator application ready for small-scale, experimental use.
Fig. 17 Finance 4.0 platform evolving across various research projects
Finance 4.0—A Socio-Ecological Finance System 85
We hope to be able to test the FIN4Xplorer application in a series of experiments
with real communities, generating feedback from users to help refine the software
design and functionality. This would enable a subsequent release based on these
insights.
The goal is to be ready to apply the concepts and application to larger-scale
experiments, e.g., in theEITClimate-KIC “DeepDemonstrations onLong-Termism”
program.29
Systems Innovation. In their strategy document 2019–2022, EIT Climate-KIC
argues that innovations at the system level are key to advance the sustainability
transformation. Systems innovations refer to “integrated and coordinated interven-
tions in economic, political and social systems and along whole value chains through
a portfolio of deliberate and connected innovation experiments” [26]. The proposed
approach of using a portfolio of experiments is designed to produce viable pathways
towards change by identifying options as well as social and behavioral inflection
points and scaling transformative solutions.
DeepDemonstrations. Demonstrating potential for change is central to the trans-
formation needed and for providing inspirational examples of what is possible. These
start with a demand-driven approach, working with city authorities, regional bodies,
governments and industry leaders, committed to a transformation to net zero emis-
sions and a resilient future. EIT Climate-KIC has initiated eight deep demonstrations
to cover a wide range of challenges.
Long-Termism. The design group has co-designed a portfolio of connected exper-
iments that are ready to be planned out and implemented. As part of the design group,
we contributed concepts for building incentive systems that promote sustainable
action and can serve as basis for sustainability-driven basic income schemes—on
the basis of the Finance 4.0 framework.
Over the course of the project, relationships with several organizations and
communities have been established to enter the next phase of experimentation:
• The KISS Foundation30 wants to bring their social time-banking scheme online;
• WWF Romania31 aims to prevent poaching with novel incentive systems;
• The Red Cross is working on community inclusion currencies;
• Haus der Materialisierung (Berlin)32 promotes circular economy communities;
• wertfrei33 is a platform promoting inclusion and sustainability.
With some organizations, several initial prototypes have been developed during
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Summary
The world today faces a range of major sustainability issues: global inequality,
financial crises, over-consumption and conflict for natural resources.
By now, there are some common goalswith respect to sustainability, as formulated
in the United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Agreement.
Agreeing on a joint set of goals in a supranational context is certainly important.
However, it represents just a first step in a longer transition, because we still face a
misalignment of goals and incentive structures.
Therefore, we propose a new approach to achieve sustainability, based on volun-
tary individual contributions and collective action incentivized by local, real-time
feedback (Fig. 18). If we compare the options—a data-driven, AI-controlled society
on the one hand and a digitally empowered participatory society on the other hand—
the latter is perhaps harder to reach. However, it is expected to be more resilient
and more successful in the long run than a top-down controlled society—and more
rewarding.
Fig. 18 Two different approaches to the digital society
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With the FIN4 system and the associated demonstrator, FuturICT 2.0 has shown
that it is technically feasible to introduce a distributed system incentivizing sustain-
able action.At numerous events and during the first edition of theClimateCityCup,34
a lot of scientists, companies and individuals around the world have demonstrated
their interest in this approach. In subsequent projects that will further extend the
FIN4 concept, new partners are expected to join the movement and help establish
this novel, participatory approach towards the creation of a more sustainable world
and a peaceful, prospering society.
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An Interaction Support Processor
to Promote Individual and Systemic
Benefits
Dirk Helbing
Abstract Individual choices, if not sufficiently well coordinated, can lead to bad
outcomes, such as systemic instabilities or failures, or “tragedies of the commons.” It
is, therefore, proposed to use digital assistants to support favorable interactions and
avoid undesirable ones. The invention discussed here describesways to perform these
tasks in a decentralized way that also protects sensitive information. Such digital
assistants offer better solutions based on local empowerment and coordination rather
than on large-scale surveillance and control. In particular, it is suggested to introduce
amulti-dimensional value exchange based onmultiple new currencies that are linked
to reputation values or sensor measurements, which may use the Internet of Things.
This novel approach expands the solution space such that new opportunities for
favorable interactions arise, which benefits the system and its components. Often,
similar results would not be achievable with classical optimization approaches and
conventional, one-dimensional value exchange only.
One day, in late 2012, I decided to write a patent application. It was not for the first
time. I had already successfully patented the idea for a self-organized traffic control
system together with a colleague.1
The new patent application was for an “Interaction Support Processor.”2 It
described the concept of digital assistants that would not only lead to better indi-
vidual decisions, but—above all—they would better coordinate people’s decisions
This Appendix is a slightly adapted version of the preprint “Interaction Support Processor—and
Why the Patenting System Is Broken”, available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/342
040513.
D. Helbing (B)
ETH Zurich, Computational Social Science, Stampfenbachstrasse 48, 8092 Zurich, Switzerland
e-mail: dhelbing@ethz.ch
1D. Helbing and S. Lämmer, Method for coordination of competing processes or for control of the
transport of mobile units within a network https://patents.google.com/patent/US8103434B2/en.
2Interaction support processor https://patents.google.com/patent/US20160350685A1/en.
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so that systemic instabilities and conflicts would be avoided.3 The invention was
about generating individual advantages, but not at the expense of others. Rather,
everyone should benefit!
The patent application proposed a “social mirror”,4 which would be a digital
representation of how certain decisions would affect the environment and others.
My goal was to achieve better decisions through “greater awareness,” and to make
people want to “behave in a more beautiful way”—quite similar to how a mirror
makes them want to “look more beautiful.”
The patent application also explained how people could be protected from adverse
decisions—by a “social protector”. In addition, it described, how they could be made
aware of favorable opportunities that theywould otherwise overlook, namely, through
a further kind of digital assistant: a “social guide”. This would also ensure that, as
far as possible, “win-lose” situations would be turned into “win-win” situations
(by means of compensation payments), so that all parties would benefit from the
interaction. For this purpose, the patent application proposed “social money”—new
types of money that could, for example, depend on reputation or measurements (see
Fig. 1).5
The ultimate goal, which should be achieved by the invention, was aworldwithout
manipulation, exploitation, and coercion. A world where people and the environ-
ment would benefit from digitally assisted, considerate behavior, and from actions
that would benefit us all. All this would happen in a way that would use digital
technologies for personal empowerment, while protecting our privacy.
The patent, I hoped, would offer a way into a positive digital future, and a way
out of the current dystopia. With the patent, I wanted to create opportunities for
companies and people, who were engaged for a better future, while there would
be obstacles for those, who just cared about profit.
Let me make a bit clearer how the invention would work, so that, in the future,
many would benefit, not just a few, as it had been the case in the past. To do this, I
will shortly summarize the idea of “social money”.
Imagine that we would have measurement methods that measure CO2, noise, or
toxins, or also good things such as resources of various kinds: glass, plastic, metals—
or health, knowledge, social, or cultural achievements. Moreover, imagine we do not
give them a price in Dollars or Euros, but we measure them in different currencies
3This idea was somewhat similar to how our traffic assistance systems worked, see e.g. A. Kesting,
M. Treiber, M. Schöhof, and D. Helbing (2008) Adaptive cruise control design for active congestion
avoidance, Transportation Research C 16(6), 668–683, https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/art
icle/pii/S0968090X08000028; S. Lämmer and D. Helbing (2008) Self-control of traffic lights and
vehicle flows in urban road networks, J. Stat. Mech., P04019, https://iopscience.iop.org/article/
10.1088/1742-5468/2008/04/P04019/meta; D. Helbing (2013) Economics 2.0: The natural step
towards a self-regulating, participatory market society. Evolutionary and Institutional Economics
Review 10, 3–41, https://link.springer.com/article/10.14441/eier.D2013002.
4Social mirror: More success through awareness and coordination, https://link.springer.com/cha
pter/10.1007/978-3-319-90869-4_17.
5Note that the concept of “social money” is somewhat similar to the concept of “qualified money”
introduced before.





























Fig. 2 Illustration of multi-dimensional value exchange, here, a payment process involving and
benefitting multiple interaction partners
that cannot be easily exchanged for each other—only at a considerable fee. So, in a
sense, we would manage different kinds of values with separate accounts.
Instead of a one-dimensionalmonetary system,where everything can be converted
in an almost frictionless way into Dollars or Euros—and where everything can be
bought with one kind of money—a multi-dimensional monetary system would be
created (see Fig. 2).6 This system would no longer be primarily about profit maxi-
mization. Social values would matter, too, ecological values as well. And one could
also consider cultural values.
Everyone could contribute to the system by various kinds of value creation—in
whatever way it suits their talents and interests. When we buy goods or services, we
would pay with a mix of currencies to compensate for their social, environmental,
and cultural values. So, we would commit not only to profit maximization, but also
to achieving social, environmental, and cultural goals, in order to earn the curren-
cies we need. Otherwise, we would have to pay a considerable exchange fee to get
the currencies we lack. With an adequate mobile phone app, however, all payment
processes would be very easy.
A multi-dimensional monetary system as described above would create a multi-
dimensional real-time feedback system. This would be much more suitable for the
control—or even self-organization—of complex systems than the basically one-
dimensional monetary system of today.7 Instead of the current economic organi-
zation, which wastes a lot of resources, a system would emerge that would work
6cf. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PJGZpV4PUwY.
7Qualified Money—A better financial system for the future, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2526022, published in this book.
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similar to nature: a resource-saving circular economy.8 It would be a new system
made possible by a new approach: through multi-dimensional co-evolution rather
than one-dimensional optimization: through coordination instead of control. This
would create a new kind of economy that would boost a (more) sustainable world
and might, thereby, be able to save millions of lives.
With such a multi-dimensional system, the economy could be much better steered
in directions that serve the environment and humanity. Several goals could be pursued
simultaneously—not just profit maximization. The world would continue to improve
through a co-evolutionary process. And we could all participate in it!
Some Background
The invention is focused on interactions among smart system components capable
of sensing, information processing, valuation, and information exchange, which
could be smart devices such as AI systems, intelligent machines, bots, or robots,
or also people using smart devices (i.e., networks of system components, where the
components comprise people and technology). For example, the interaction support
processor could be a particular, novel kind of personal digital assistant. Detailed
specifications are made in the main body of the patent.9
Sensing (sensor measurements) play(s) a role
– to determine and valuate the local context of the prospective actions and interac-
tions, and of alternative actions and interactions (where possible interventions or
possible value exchanges have been added),10
– for the measurement of the actions and interactions in the system and their effects
(e.g., for a data-driven valuation),
– for a data-driven modeling and simulation of the action and interaction effects,
– for sensor-measurement-based kinds of value exchanges.
Information processing plays a role for data management, for the determination of
possible interventions and possible value exchanges, and for the valuation of actions
and interactions with and without these.
Valuation is needed to compare a scenario given by prospective actions and inter-
actions with scenarios given by these prospective actions and interactions when
possible interventions and possible value exchanges are added to them.
Information exchange is needed to communicate between different system
components, particularly in a distributed, privacy-protecting implementation.
8The FIN4 Project: Towards a Socio-Ecological Finance System, by Dirk Helbing, https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=XnemIMW7e3c.
9See [0024]f, [0047], [0117] in https://patents.google.com/patent/US20160350685A1/en.
10Throughout the main body of the patent, many ways of determining context by means of
modern digital technologies have been described, see https://patentscope.wipo.int/search/en/det
ail.jsf?docId=WO2015118455.
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In contrast to what we have today, we are talking here mainly about a multi-
dimensional value exchange system.11 This is important as it increases the optimiza-
tion space and, therefore, the set of possible solutions, and hence allows for better
solutions than without the consideration of this multi-dimensional value exchange
system. It creates additional possibilities to improve the system as compared to
today’s scenario analysis techniques or current monetary compensation schemes
in our economy. The proposed multi-dimensionality of value exchange is the
main reason why the invention allows to find solutions that benefit all system
components—in contrast to the systems known today.
The invention focuses on interventions that consider a plurality of value
exchanges. This implies that not only feedback effects are being considered, as this is
being done by applied “scenario analysis,” but that additionally value exchanges are
explored. The consideration of multi-dimensional digitally based value exchanges12
is one of the aspects, which sets the invention apart from the state-of-the art in
technological, social or economic systems at the time this patent application was
submitted.
What the invention proposes is very different from what is being done and
discussed today, where each thing, e.g., CO2, glass bottles for recycling, poisons,
or any other kind of externalities is given a certain value or price in Dollars,
say, and where there is quite frictionless exchange between different kinds of curren-
cies or assets, which makes today’s money-based feedback system effectively one-
dimensional (i.e., there is one overall price, which supports utilitarian approaches).
In contrast, the system proposed here is designed in such a way that it is a multi-
dimensional real-time feedback system in an action space that has been extended by
the possibility to exchange multiple kinds of values. Moreover, the invention specifies
novel kinds of (monetary) values, which are defined on the basis of measurements
or reputation values, for example.
Further aspects can be illustrated for the case, where a system component’s valua-
tion of prospective actions and interactions is done via a goal functionG. In classical
optimization, a goal function G(x) is optimized as a function of some variables x
(where x, accordingly, may represent a vector). As G is a one-dimensional quantity,
one can always say whether a solution G(x1) is better (>), worse (<), or equal (=) in
quality. Otherwise (i.e., for a multi-dimensional goal function), the classical method
of optimization does not work.
If you have two ormore goal functionsG1,G2 …, this kind of > , < ,= comparison
cannot be done. As one changes x, one goal may be better achieved and the other one
may take on a worse value [i.e.,G1(x1) >G1(x), whileG2(x1) <G2(x)]. The invention
describes what to do in order to achieve solutions where two or more goal functions
are simultaneously improved. Such a solution often does not exist with one kind of
value exchange. It requires a multi-dimensional value exchange system.
11See [0062], [0146]ff, [0156]ff in https://patents.google.com/patent/US20160350685A1/en.
12See [0062], [0146]ff, [0156]ff in https://patents.google.com/patent/US20160350685A1/en.
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As this content has not been published anywhere else, below I will provide the
revised claim set which had finally been submitted for approval in the USA.13
Appendix
Claims14
1. A computer-implemented method, comprising:
under the control of one or more computer systems configured with
executable instructions,
maintaining system component data of a plurality of system components
in a system component data structure;
maintaining transaction data of a plurality of transactions in a transaction
data structure, wherein a transaction in the plurality of transactions is a
record of an interaction between two or more system components of the
plurality of system components;
evaluating components of a prospective transaction among a set of prospec-
tive system components, wherein the components include whether each
system component of the set of prospective system components has an
initial positive valuation of the prospective transaction thereby providing
a favorable interaction transaction as to such system components, and
which, if any system component of the set of prospective system compo-
nents has an initial negative valuation of the prospective transaction
thereby providing an unfavorable interaction transaction as to such system
components;
determining, based on a computer analysis of the components of the
prospective transaction and a rules data structure that defines value
exchanges and feedback effects, whether a prospective value exchange or
a prospective feedback effect, when added to the prospective transaction,
results in an unfavorable interaction transaction as to a particular system
13There is only this preprint https://www.researchgate.net/publication/342040513, where one can
also find the claims I have draftedmyself. By the way, my latest claim set starts out with amore tech-
nical specification, as it was always intended: A computer-implemented method, comprising a
network of system components capable of sensing, information processing, valuation, and infor-
mation exchange under the control of one or more computer systems configured with executable
instructions...
14In the meantime, the title of the invention had been changed to “Computer-Based Interactions
in Techno-Socio-Economic-Environmental Support Systems with Technical, Social, Economic,
and/or Environmental Transaction Management and Processing”. Note that it has been stated
that these claims would not be patentable in the USA and, hence, the patent application has been
abandoned over there. The positive implication of this is that (if I understand patent law correctly)
everybody should now be able to use the ideas presented here in the USA and many other
countries for free. Note, however, that the application is still pending in some countries.
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component being converted into a favorable interaction transaction as to
that particular system component;
determining, based on the computer analysis of the components of the
prospective transaction and the rules data structure, whether a condition
is present in which (1) a proposed value exchange and (2) a proposed
feedback effect are present in the rules data structure that, when added
to the prospective transaction, results in the prospective transaction being
converted into a favorable interaction transaction as to each prospective
system component using that prospective transaction; and
outputting, based on whether the condition is present, terms of a modified
transaction to each prospective system component, wherein the modified
transaction is the prospective transaction modified by the proposed value
exchange and the proposed feedback effect.
2. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, wherein the prospective
transaction is characterized as to each prospective system component of
the prospective transaction as being one of: (1) a win-win situation, (2) a
good win-lose situation, (3) a bad win-lose situation, and (4) a lose-lose
situation.
3. The computer-implementedmethod of claim1,wherein the proposed value
exchange or the proposed feedback effect are based on computations done
using data provided by a third-party broker.
4. The computer-implemented method of claim 1, wherein the proposed
value exchange and the proposed feedback effect further include deter-
mining expected behaviors and social norms according to averages of social
behaviors over actual measured behaviors.
5–7. (Canceled)
8. A computer-implemented method, comprising:
under the control of one or more computer systems configured with
executable instructions,
maintaining system component data of a plurality of system components
in a system component data structure;
maintaining transaction data of a plurality of transactions in a transaction
data structure, wherein a transaction in the plurality of transactions is a
record of an interaction between two or more system components of the
plurality of system components;
evaluating components of a prospective transaction among a set of prospec-
tive system components, wherein the components include relative valu-
ations of the set of prospective system components participating in the
prospective transaction;
aligning value changes of a system and at least one component of the
prospective transaction according to a respective valuation of interactions
or potential interactions;
determining, based on computer analysis of the components of the prospec-
tive transaction and a rules data structure that defines value exchanges and
feedback effects, whether a prospective value exchange or a prospective
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feedback effect, when added to the prospective transaction, results in an
unfavorable interaction transaction as to a particular system component
being converted into a favorable interaction transaction as to that particular
system component; and
flagging the prospective transaction as being one of a favorable transac-
tion, an unfavorable transaction, or a semi-favorable transaction, wherein
a semi-favorable transaction is defined as a transaction that is convertible
to a favorable transaction via a bargaining and value exchange, wherein
an unfavorable transaction is defined as a transaction wherein at least one
system component of the set of prospective system components has a nega-
tive valuation of the prospective transaction, and a favorable transaction
is defined as a transaction wherein each system component of the set of
prospective system components has a positive valuation of the prospective
transaction.
9. (Cancelled)
10. The computer-implemented method of claim 8, wherein the prospective
transaction comprises sensitive data and the sensitive data is managed by
a third-party broker computer system such that it is not available to each
of the plurality of system components.
11. The computer-implemented method of claim 8, further comprising deter-
mining reputation values and recommendations according to reputation
filters, the reputation filters being personally configurable and shared by
system components.
12–15. (Cancelled)
16. The computer-implemented method of claim 8, further comprising:
Operating a reputation-based online information filtering system to:
(a) accept a set of ratings, the set of ratings being ratings of online
information objects obtained from one or more of the system
components;
(b) determine a set of reputation weights, the set of reputation weights
being weights of users of the one or more of the system components;
(c) store, into a rating database, data representing the set of ratings and
the set of reputation weights;
(d) generate a personal information filter data structure of an information
filter derived from the data representing the set of ratings and the set
of reputation weights; and
(e) provide viewing user access to the personal information filter data
structure, thereby allowing a viewing user to filter online information
according to a perspective defined by the set of ratings and the set of
reputation weights,
wherein a rating of the set of ratings is a numerical value provided by a
rating user for a particular time, weighted by one ormore relevanceweights
and a reputation weight of the rating user and updated over time, rating a
specified online information object,
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wherein relevanceweights for a posted rating are based on a postingmanner
in which the posted ratingwas posted, with a higher relevanceweight given
to a posting manner that provides greater information about the rating user,
wherein online information is presentable to the viewing user filtered
according to the personal information filter data structurewhen the viewing
user selects to filter according to the personal information filter data
structure, and
wherein a set of reputation weights of the rating user are a function
of a manner in which the rating user has previously rated other online
information objects.
17. The computer-implemented method of claim 16, wherein the information
filter is derived from ratings of a plurality of rating system components.
18. The computer-implemented method of claim 16, wherein the personal
information filter data structure is in a form sharable among system compo-
nents, thereby forming socially sharable information filters, the socially
sharable information filters being personally configurable by a receiving
system component or automatically configurable according to a context.
19. The computer-implementedmethod of claim16, further comprising a value
exchange system for system components of the value exchange system to
use to transfer value, and wherein value transfers to the rating user are, at
least in part, a function of a reputation weight of that rating user.
20. The computer-implemented method of claim 16, further comprising a
feedback system, wherein the reputation weight of the rating user varies
according to an alignment of the rating user with a set of social media
expectations.
21. The computer-implemented method of claim 16, wherein the one or more
relevance weights comprise one or more of:
(a) a time span between a rating time when the rating user rated a partic-
ular online information object and when that rating is used in a
filter,
(b) the posting manner in which the rating user posted the rating, the
posting manner being one of anonymously, pseudo-anonymously, or
personalized,
(c) a frequency with which the rating user posts ratings,
(d) a number of ratings the rating user posted, and
(e) a quality with which the rating user classified the particular online
information object.
22. The reputation-based online information filtering system of claim 21,
wherein a first rating posted anonymously is given a first relevance weight,
a second rating posted pseudo-anonymously is given a second relevance
weight, and a personalized rating identifying the rating user is given a
third relevance weight, wherein the first relevance weight is lower than the
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second relevance weight, and the second relevance weight is lower than
the third relevance weight.
23. The reputation-based online information filtering system of claim 21,
wherein the quality is a function of whether a class, selected from among
advertisement, opinion, or fact, into which the rating user classified the
particular online information object is a class consistent with a class
selected by other system components for the particular online information
object.
24. The reputation-based online information filtering system of claim 21,
further comprising afilter interaction system,wherein personal information
filter data structures are exchanged among system components of the filter
interaction system, at least one exchange ofwhich includes a corresponding
transfer of value between system components.
25. The reputation-based online information filtering system of claim 16,
wherein the rating, by the rating user, of a particular online information
object, is weighted by a number of ratings previously made by the rating
user, wherein the rating is down-weighted when the number of ratings
previously made by the rating user is high or frequent, and wherein the
rating is up-weighted when the number of ratings previously made by the
rating user is low or infrequent.
26. The reputation-based online information filtering system of claim 16,
wherein a rating of the specified online information object over a plurality
of rating users is determined according to an equation:
r j (t) =
∑
i ri j (ti j ) fi j (ti j )wi (ti j )p
t−ti j
∑






wherein rj(t) is the rating of an online information object, j, at time t, i
is an index of the rating user, rij(t) is the rating of the online information
object, j, given by rating user i, wi(t) is the rating given at time t, p is a
decay factor ranging from 0 to 1, and f is a reliability factor,
wherein the rating of the online information object, j, over the plurality of
rating users is further weighed by a variance of ratings over the plurality
of rating users, and
wherein the rating, rj(t) = Nj(t)/Dj(t), of the online information object,
j, over the plurality of rating users is stored in computer memory as a
nominator, Nj(t) = Nj(t′)pt−t ′ + rij(t)f ij(t)wi(t), and a denominator, Dj(t)
= Dj(t′)pt−t ′ + f ij(t)wi(t), and a previous updating time, t′.
27. The reputation-based online information filtering system of claim 16,
wherein the specified online information object is one or more of an item
of content or posting relating to a product, company, or subject.
28. A computer-implemented method, comprising:
instantiating a plurality of system components, implemented using one or
more computer systems configured with executable instructions, wherein
one or more of the plurality of system components is configured to
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perform sensing, information processing, valuation computation, and/or
information exchange;
maintaining a system component data structure, wherein a system compo-
nent data structure comprises data about a system component;
maintaining an action data structure comprising a plurality of action data
records, wherein an action data record comprises data about an action of a
system component of the plurality of system components;
maintaining an interaction data structure comprising interaction records,
wherein an interaction record is a record of an interaction between two or
more system components of the plurality of system components;
determining, for each given system component in the plurality of system
components, a valuation of prospective actions and prospective interactions
between the given system component and other system components;
determining possible feedback effects;
determining a plurality of possible value exchanges;
determining for the given system components in the plurality of system
components, valuations of the prospective actions and the prospective inter-
actions between the given system component and other system components
when the possible feedback effects or possible value exchanges are added
to the prospective actions and prospective interactions, based at least upon
a data analysis of previous interactions or a computer simulation; and
identifying, based on computer analyses, whether a condition exists in
which proposed interventions result in the prospective interactions being
converted into favorable interactions with improved valuations.
29. The computer-implemented method of claim 28, wherein the proposed
interventions are used to prevent negative valuations.
30. The computer-implementedmethodof claim28,wherein the possible value
exchanges or the possible feedback effects are based on distributed compu-
tations such that other system components are excluded from access to
sensitive data.
31. The computer-implementedmethodof claim28,wherein the possible value
exchanges and the possible feedback effects further consider expected
behaviors of system components based on averages of actually measured
behaviors or desired behaviors based on stated preferences or maximum
possible values of certain goal functions.
32. The computer-implemented method of claim 28, wherein a multi-
dimensional feedback systemandvalue exchange system is implemented to
support self-organization of a system comprising a plurality of interacting
system components.
33. The computer-implemented method of claim 28, wherein the valuations of
the prospective actions and the prospective interactions take into account
a reputation value of a plurality of reputation values related to system
components, actions, or interactions.
34. The computer-implemented method of claim 33, wherein the reputation
value is determined by sensor measurements.
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35. The computer-implemented method of claim 33, wherein the reputation
value is determined by reputation filters.
36. The computer-implemented method of claim 33, wherein the reputation
value is used to define values in a value exchange system.
37. The computer-implemented method of claim 33, wherein the reputation
value is determined by ratings.
38. The computer-implemented method of claim 37, wherein ratings of
different system components are scaled in such a way that each consid-
ered system component has a same overall weight when rating system
components, actions, or interactions, independently of a number of ratings
sent.
39. The computer-implementedmethod of claim 37,wherein a rating of a spec-
ified online information object over a plurality of rating systemcomponents
is determined according to an equation:
r j (t) =
∑
i ri j (ti j ) fi j (ti j )wi (ti j )p
t−ti j
∑






wherein rj(t) is the rating of an online information object, j, at time t, i is
an index of the rating system component, rij(t) is the rating of the online
information object, j, given by rating system component i,wi(t) is the rating
given at time t, p is a decay factor ranging from 0 to 1, and f is a reliability
factor,
wherein the rating of the online information object, j, over the plurality of
rating system components is further weighed by a variance of ratings over
the plurality of rating system components, and
wherein the rating, rj(t) = Nj(t)/Dj(t), of the online information object,
j, over the plurality of rating system components is stored in computer
memory as a nominator,Nj(t)=Nj(t′)pt−t ′ + rij(t)f ij(t)wi(t), and a denom-
inator, Dj(t) = Dj(t′)pt−t ′ + f ij(t)wi(t), and a previous updating time,
t′.
40. A computer-implemented method, comprising:
instantiating a plurality of system components, implemented using one or
more computer systems configured with executable instructions, wherein
one or more of the plurality of system components is configured to
perform sensing, information processing, valuation computation, and/or
information exchange;
maintaining a system component data structure, wherein a system compo-
nent data structure comprises data about a system component;
maintaining an action data structure comprising a plurality of action data
records, wherein an action data record comprises data about an action of a
system component of the plurality of system components;
maintaining an interaction data structure comprising interaction records,
wherein an interaction record is a record of an interaction between two or
more system components of the plurality of system components;
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evaluating components of a prospective interaction among a set of consid-
ered system components, wherein considered system components include
references to relative valuations of a set of prospective system components
of the prospective interaction;
aligning value changes of a system and at least one component of the
prospective interaction according to a respective valuation of interactions
or potential interactions;
determining, based on computer analysis of the prospective interaction and
a rules data structure that defines value exchanges and feedback effects,
whether a prospective value exchange or a prospective feedback effect,
when added to the prospective interaction, results in an unfavorable inter-
action as to a particular system component being converted into a favorable
interaction as to that particular system component; and
flagging the prospective interaction as being a favorable interaction, an
unfavorable interaction, or a semi-favorable interaction, wherein a semi-
favorable interaction is defined as an interaction that is convertible into a
favorable interaction via a value exchange, wherein an unfavorable inter-
action is defined as an interaction wherein at least one system component
of the set of prospective system components has a negative valuation of the
prospective interaction, and a favorable interaction is defined as an inter-
action wherein each system component of the set of prospective system
components has a positive valuation of the prospective interaction.
41. The computer-implemented method of claim 40, wherein the prospective
interaction comprises exchange of sensitive data and the sensitive data is
managed in a distributed way by third-party computer systems such that
excluded from access by other system components.
42. The computer-implemented method of claim 40, considering a reputation
value of a plurality of reputation values related to system components,
actions, or interactions.
43. The computer-implemented method of claim 42, wherein the reputation
value is determined by sensor measurements.
44. The computer-implemented method of claim 42, wherein the reputation
value is determined by reputation filters.
45. The computer-implemented method of claim 42, wherein the reputation
value is used to define values in a value exchange system.
46. The computer-implemented method of claim 42, wherein the reputation
value is determined by ratings.
47. The computer-implemented method of claim 46, wherein ratings of
different system components are scaled in such a way that every consid-
ered system component has the same overall weight when rating system
components, actions, or interactions, independently of a number of ratings
sent.
48. The computer-implementedmethod of claim 46,wherein a rating of a spec-
ified online information object over a plurality of rating systemcomponents
is determined according to an equation:
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r j (t) =
∑
i ri j (ti j ) fi j (ti j )wi (ti j )p
t−ti j
∑






wherein rj(t) is the rating of an online information object, j, at time t, i is
an index of the rating system component, rij(t) is the rating of the online
information object, j, given by rating system component i,wi(t) is the rating
given at time t, p is a decay factor ranging from 0 to 1, and f is a reliability
factor,
wherein the rating of the online information object, j, over the plurality of
rating system components is further weighed by a variance of ratings over
the plurality of rating system components, and
wherein the rating, rj(t) = Nj(t)/Dj(t), of the online information object,
j, over the plurality of rating system components is stored in computer
memory as a nominator,Nj(t)=Nj(t′)pt−t ′ + rij(t)f ij(t)wi(t), and a denom-
inator, Dj(t) = Dj(t′)pt−t ′ + f ij(t)wi(t), and a previous updating time,
t′.
49. A computer-implemented method for promoting participatory value or
information exchange, comprising:
under the control of one or more computer systems configured with
executable instructions,
promoting responsible exchange by at least partial transparency of trans-
actions;
representing a plurality of money categories; and
introducing at least one transaction charge for converting among the
plurality of money categories.
50. The computer-implemented method of claim 49, wherein the at least one
transaction charge is an exchange fee and/or a tax.
51. The computer-implementedmethod of claim 49, further comprising distin-
guishing among money of the plurality of money categories in order to
encourage particular kinds of consumption or real investments or other
desired effects, actions, or interactions.
52. The computer-implemented method of claim 49, wherein the plurality of
money categories comprises cash, real electronic money, virtual electronic
money, and/or multi-dimensional money.
53. The computer-implemented method of claim 49, wherein the prospective
interaction comprises exchange of sensitive data and the sensitive data is
managed in a distributed way by third-party computer systems such that
excluded from access by other system components.
54. The computer-implemented method of claim 49, considering a reputation
value of a plurality of reputation values related to system components,
actions, or interactions.
55. The computer-implemented method of claim 54, wherein the reputation
value is determined by sensor measurements.
56. The computer-implemented method of claim 54, wherein the reputation
value is determined by reputation filters.
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57. The computer-implemented method of claim 54, wherein the reputation
value is used to define values in a value exchange system.
58. The computer-implemented method of claim 54, wherein the reputation
value is determined by ratings.
59. The computer-implemented method of claim 58, wherein ratings of
different system components are scaled in such a way that every consid-
ered system component has the same overall weight when rating system
components, actions, or interactions, independently of number of ratings
sent.
60. The computer-implementedmethod of claim 58,wherein a rating of a spec-
ified online information object over a plurality of rating systemcomponents
is determined according to an equation:
r j (t) =
∑
i ri j (ti j ) fi j (ti j )wi (ti j )p
t−ti j
∑






wherein rj(t) is the rating of an online information object, j, at time t, i is
an index of the rating system component, rij(t) is the rating of the online
information object, j, given by rating system component i,wi(t) is the rating
given at time t, p is a decay factor ranging from 0 to 1, and f is a reliability
factor,
wherein the rating of the online information object, j, over the plurality of
rating system components is further weighed by a variance of ratings over
the plurality of rating system components, and
wherein the rating, rj(t) = Nj(t)/Dj(t), of the online information object,
j, over the plurality of rating system components is stored in computer
memory as a nominator,Nj(t)=Nj(t′)pt−t ′ + rij(t)f ij(t)wi(t), and a denom-
inator, Dj(t) = Dj(t′)pt−t ′ + f ij(t)wi(t), and a previous updating time,
t′.
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Glossary
Blockchain A blockchain is a distributed ledger that is collectively written and
maintained by a network through a distributed consensus mechanism.
Cognitive dissonance The mental conflict that arises when ingrained beliefs or
assumptions are contradicted by new information.
Consensus Consensus is the mechanism through which entries are written to the
distributed ledger technologywhile adhering to a set of rules that all participants
enforce when an entry containing transactions is validated.
Cryptocurrency A cryptocurrency is a digital asset designed to work as a medium
of exchange using cryptography to secure the transactions and to control the
creation of addition units of the currency. (Wikipedia—cited in Technical Report
M12 where the definition is somewhat longer).
Cryptoeconomic Design (CED) The options and choices of how a cryptoeconomy
regulates value exchange among its participants is referred to as cryptoeconomic
design (CED). CED plays a key role in the stability of a DLT system in terms of
convergenceliveness, and fairness.
Crypto wallet A cryptocurrency wallet is a physical devicea desktop, or mobile
app, which stores public and/or private keys to control cryptocurrencies. They
often also offer the functionality of encrypting and/or signing information (e.g.,
to execute a smart contract or cryptocurrency transaction. Example: MetaMask
is a mobile app to manage the Ethereum cryptocurrency
DApp A decentralized application within the context of Web 3.0 which does not
rely on a centralized provider.
Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) Distributed ledger technology encom-
passes systems of distributed ledgersconsensusmechanisms, and other elements.
Here, nodes participate in a distributed data structure which contains entries
serving as digital records of actions, governed by a consensus mechanism. A
blockchain is a type of DLT.
Externality An externality is a cost or benefit that affects a party who did not choose
to incur that cost or benefit.
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Fiat money Conventional paper- and coin-based currency issued by a centralized
entitytypically a central bank, and declared as legal tender by governments.
Examples include euros, dollars, and pounds sterling.
Fork In blockchain terminologya fork typically refers to a situation in which a
previously incompatible change in protocol occurs, resulting in the divergence
of two sets of protocol. For instance, this can happenwhen a community around a
cryptocurrency disagrees on the implementation of code changes, thereby split-
ting the community and creating a new token in parallel with the existing token
following the established rule set.
Gas In the Ethereumprotocolgas is the fee required in order to carry out a transaction
or run a smart contract on the blockchain.
ICT Abbreviation for Information and Communication Technology.
Internet of Things (IoT) The Internet of Things is a system of interrelated devices-
machines, objects, animals or people that are assigned unique identifiers and
given the ability to transfer data over a network without the need for manual
interaction.
Meta tokens Meta tokens are tokens that give a user access to platform services
and/or the right to participate in decisions that concern the overall structureim-
plementation, and further development of a system.
Oracle Blockchains cannot directly communicate with the outside world. They
therefore rely on trustworthy external data sourcesknown as oracles. Oracles
can be based on software (websites and portals) or hardware (IoT sensors).
Proof of Stake A proof-of-stake protocol is a consensus mechanism according to
which network participants canmine or validate entries depending on the number
of tokens they hold.
Proof of Work Aproof-of-work protocol is a consensusmechanism that secures the
network by requiring work from participants in order to write to the blockchain.
In the case of Bitcoinfor exampleminers have to expend processing power and
energy in order to solve hash functions and mine a new block.
Quadratic voting Quadratic voting is ameans of decisionmaking that helps prevent
problems associated with the accumulation of power in multi-vote systems.
The “price” of a vote equals its square each additional therefore comes at a
significantly higher price.
Smart contract A piece of executable software code that is written onto the
Ethereum blockchain. Once deployedit is immutable and can be executed by
anyone on the network.
Token A token is a store of value issued within a DLT system and which can be
used as a medium of exchange or unit of account.
Token curated registry (TCR) A list of objects (e.g. web linkstokens, etc.) that
are maintained by a group of users. They manage the list through proposing,
challenging, and voting using a special TCR token. In the case of Finance 4.0,
the GOV token is used to manage the list of official Positive Action Tokens.
Transaction Transactions are the digital representations of actions that are logged
in the distributed ledger of a DLT system.
Glossary 109
Web 2.0 The Internet of online applications that are offered by central providers. The
most well-known examples of these providers include Facebook, Amazon, and
Google.
Web 3.0 The emerging form of decentralized online applications which do away
with the need for central providers.
